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This thesis explores the multi-faceted and complex negotiations that took place 
between Bulgaria and Europe’s major alliance systems at the start of World War I as both 
groups attempted to convince Bulgaria to enter the conflict on their side.  Drawing on 
published document collections from the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary) 
and the Allies (Great Britain, France, and Russia), as well as unpublished materials from 
the German Foreign Office, this work explores the evolution of the interest of both power 
groups in Bulgaria and the nature of their negotiations for an alliance with it, looking at 
the reasons why Bulgaria ultimately joined the Central Powers in September 1915. 
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Introduction 
 
In July 1915, as the realties of a prolonged European conflict set in, Gustav 
Michahelles, the German ambassador to Sofia, attended the State funeral of the Bulgarian 
Exarch.1  According to tradition, the diplomatic staffs of the countries represented in 
Bulgaria took part in the funeral procession.  What transpired, however, was anything but 
traditional.  As the staffs lined up, Michahelles arranged for the German and Austrian 
Legations, dressed in their smart military uniforms, to stand in front of those from 
Britain, France, Russia and Italy, and directly behind the ministers of all the states 
present.  Quite pleased with the visual effect of Germany and Austria leading the Entente 
powers, Michahelles hoped Tsar Ferdinand, the ruler of Bulgaria, would take note. 
 The first to perceive what Michahelles had planned, however, were those who 
found themselves marching behind the Germans and the Austrians.  Believing it most 
undesirable they should lose ground to the Central Powers, the Entente legations waited 
for an opportune time to outflank their rivals.  As they came to a bend in the road hidden 
from view, the procession, led by the staffs of the Central Powers, bogged down.   
Leading the Allied charge, Sir Henry Napier, the British military attaché, guided the 
Entente legations as they edged forward and around those of the Central Powers.  By the 
time the procession emerged into the sight of the populace, the Entente was now in the 
lead.  Infuriated and annoyed that he had been beaten at his own game, Michahelles 
                                                 
1 Joeseph I was the Bulgarian Exarch from 1877 to 1915.  The Bulgarian Exarchate was 
the official name of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which officially broke from the 
Greek Patriarchate in 1872.  The Exarch was a bishop who served the head of the Church.  
Richard J. Crampton, Bulgaria (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2007, pp. 63-81. 
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rushed to find a way to turn the tables back in his favor.  Fortunately, he later discovered 
that the majority of the photographs taken of this parade did not show the Entente at the 
head of the march of legations, but rather Germany and Austria.  It was these photos that 
Michahelles showed Ferdinand and Prime Minister Vasil Radoslavov as proof the Central 
Powers were in the lead for Bulgaria’s support in the war.2 
This long-forgotten story from the reminiscences of Gustav Michahelles, itself 
buried in the archives of the German Foreign Office, is emblematic of the rivalry between 
alliance systems that dominated Bulgaria’s interactions with the Great Powers in the first 
year of World War I.  During this period, both Berlin and London expended considerable 
time and diplomatic effort to gain Bulgarian support, and it was only after a year of many 
political and diplomatic reversals that Sofia finally joined the Central Powers.  This thesis 
explores the multi-faceted and complex negotiations that took place during 1914-1915 as 
both alliance groups attempted to convince Bulgaria to enter the conflict on their side.  In 
doing so, it will draw attention to the importance of intermediate powers such as Bulgaria 
in the politics of both alliance camps and better place the Balkans in the overall narrative 
                                                 
2 Gustav Michahelles, Im kaiserlichen Dienst: Erlebnisse des kaiserlichen Gesandten a. 
D. wirklichen geheimen Rates (unpublished manuscript), p. 148.  A copy of this 
manuscript is located at the Poltisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts in Berlin. See also, 
H.D. Napier, Experiences of a Military Attaché in the Balkans (London: Drane’s, 1924), 
pp. 169-170.  A career diplomat who made his mark as a kind of diplomatic fireman in 
the Imperial service by representing German interests in strategically important areas at 
critical times (Zanzibar in 1890, when Britain and Germany agreed to a swap of the 
African island for Helgoland as part of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890; Bolivia in 
1902, when Germany first opened diplomatic relations with La Paz; and Brazil in 1910, 
following a scandal involving his predecessor and the disappearance of important Foreign 
Ministry documents), Michahelles had been dispatched to Sofia in 1914 with the 
important task of securing Bulgaria’s attachment to the Central Powers.  Additional 
details of his career are contained in his autobiography, cited above. 
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of the Great War, showing that the Balkans and Bulgaria played a major role in the war 
plans of both blocs and that both sides expended considerable effort in trying to secure its 
support.  Bulgaria’s entry into the war was not inevitable either in timing or form, and the 
manner in which it did join this conflict reveals a great deal about the relative diplomatic 
weaknesses of both sides in the first year of the war and the important value mid-size 
powers held.  Consequently, this thesis seeks to determine how Germany succeeded 
where Britain failed and, ultimately, why Bulgaria chose to join the Central Powers.  
This is a point that remains largely unexamined by scholars of World War I, 
whose works subordinate the Eastern theatre to a secondary role.3  Indeed Richard 
Crampton, the leading western historian on Bulgaria, readily admits that Bulgaria during 
the First World War remains understudied.4  Even in general histories of the Balkans, the 
role of Bulgaria and the other Balkan states during the conflict is given little attention.5  
                                                 
3 John Keegan, The First World War (Vintage: New York, 2000); Richard Hamilton and 
Holger Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004); Holger H. Herwig, The First World War (London: Arnold, 1997); Cyril Falls, The 
First World War (London: Longmans, 1960); Jennifer Keene, World War I (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 2006); David Stevenson, The First World War and International 
Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004); A. J . P. Taylor, The First World War: An 
Illustrated History (London: Harnish Hamilton, 1963). 
4 Richard J. Crampton, Bulgaria; A Concise History of Bulgaria (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997); Bulgaria 1878-1918 (New York: East European Monographs, 
1983); The Hollow Détente: Anglo-German Relations in the Balkans, 1911-1914 
(London: George Prior, 1979). 
5 Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Balkans (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1966); The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1977); Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, editors, 
History of the Balkans in Transition: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and 
Politics since the Eighteenth Century (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1974); Barbara 
Jelavich, The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814-1918 (Hamden, CT: Archon 
Books, 1975); History of the Balkans, 2 volumes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983); L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: Holt and Reinhart, 
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While several scholars have given some consideration to the Balkans in the early war 
period, none have provided a truly comprehensive examination.   Lynn Curtright’s 
Muddle, Indecision and Setback, offers an excellent discussion of Britain’s Eastern policy 
in the early days of the war, but only touches upon the complexities of Whitehall’s 
Bulgarian policy.6  No comparable work exists that discusses the German side of this 
subject.  Richard Hall’s excellent monograph Bulgaria’s Entry into the First World War 
is the only secondary source that examines this topic more generally, but he treats it more 
as a domestic and political issue rather than a diplomatic one.7  To be sure, scholars have 
tackled the diplomacy regarding Sofia joining the conflict, notably Simeon Damianov in 
his article “Bulgaria’s Decision to Enter the War: Diplomatic Negotiations, 1913-15.”  
Damianov makes use of primary sources, such as Bulgarian document collections, but his 
article is relatively short.  His goal is, in his own words, to set in motion the “adopt[ion] 
of a more comprehensive approach to this question [of Bulgaria siding with the Central 
Powers], taking into consideration the objective situation,” something that was ignored 
for a long time, in particular by Bulgarian and other Balkan scholars.8   
                                                                                                                                                 
1953); The Balkans, 1815-1914 (New York: Holt, and Reinhart, 1963); Milorad Ekmečić, 
Serbia’s War Aims in 1914 (Belgrade: Srpska knjižizevna zadruga, 1992); The Creation 
of Yugoslavia, 1790-1918, 2 volumes (Belgrade: Srpska knjižizevna zadruga, 1987).   
6 Lynn H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision and Setback: British Policy and the Balkan 
States, August 1914 to the Inception of the Dardanelles Campaign (Thessaloniki: 
Institute for Balkan Studies, 1986). 
7 Richard C. Hall, Bulgaria’s Road to the First World War (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996). 
8 Simeon Damianov, “Bulgaria’s Decision to Enter the War: Diplomatic Negotiations, 
1914-15,” in War and Society in East Central Europe, edited by Béla K. Király, Nándor 
F. Dreisiger, and Albert A Nofi, volume XIX: East Central European Society in World 
War I (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 157. 
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Some studies have been written that examine the existence of a rivalry over 
Bulgaria, yet they do not investigate Bulgaria’s entry in much detail.  Richard 
Crampton’s The Hollow Détente, for example, discusses the emergence of an Anglo-
Germany rivalry in the Balkans, but Bulgaria does not play a central role in this study.9  
Luigi Albertini’s massive three-volume work, The Origins of the War of 1914, focuses on 
the conflict from a more Balkan perspective and thus discusses the important role that 
Sofia played in the plans of the two power groups.  As his work examines only the 
origins and early days of the hostilities, however, he admits “it lies outside the scope of 
the present work to trace the efforts of the two belligerent groups to win Bulgaria over.”10   
Studies of World War I diplomacy give limited attention to Bulgaria and the 
complex negotiations to win its support.  David Dutton examines British and French 
policy in the Balkans during the First World War in his excellent work, The Politics of 
Diplomacy, but he begins just as Bulgaria has cast its lot with the Central Powers.  
Consequently, its entry into the conflict is reduced to a few pages.11  Reneé Albrecht 
Carrié’s celebrated Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna mentions 
this topic only briefly as well, largely due to the broad scope of this seminal work.12   
                                                 
9 Richard J. Crampton, The Hollow Détente: Anglo-German Relations in the Balkans, 
1911-1914 (London: George Prior, 1979). 
10 Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, translated and edited by Isabella M. 
Massey, volume III: The Epilogue of the Crisis of July 1914: The Declarations of War 
and Neutrality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 604. 
11David Dutton, The Politics of Diplomacy: Britain and France in the Balkans in the 
First World War (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998). 
12 Reneé Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna 
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973). 
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Perhaps the best study of the diplomatic side of Bulgaria’s entry into this conflict 
is Bulgaria’s Entrance into the First World War, a diplomatic study by Anne Holden.  
Since its publication in 1976, however, the intervening years have left much open to new 
study and interpretation.13  Her monograph is an excellent start, but it only scratches the 
surface of this complicated issue.  Its strongest point is the discussion of the loan 
negotiations of 1914, but many diplomatic angles remain neglected.   
Building upon the sources Holden and others have consulted, this thesis draws 
upon the British Documents on Foreign Affairs, one of the best published sources on 
British diplomacy, as well as unpublished document collections from the archives of 
Germany’s Auswärtiges Amt.  Of particular relevance are the unpublished memoirs of 
Gustav Michahelles, the German ambassador to Bulgaria during this period.  His 
memoirs, seldom looked at by scholars, provide a first-hand look at the evolution of 
German policy during this period and fills out the somewhat terse diplomatic exchanges 
in official correspondence.  
With the success of the Russian and Bulgarian forces against the Ottomans in the 
Russo-Turkish War in 1878, Bulgaria began to emerge as an important piece in the 
Bismarckian diplomatic system.  The Treaty of San Stefano, dictated by Russia in March 
1878, established a large Bulgarian state (roughly one-third of the core Balkan Peninsula) 
whose territorial extent corresponded roughly to the boundaries of the Bulgarian 
exarchate grudgingly conceded by the Ottomans in 1870.  Stretching from the banks of 
the Danube in the north to the Aegean Sea in the south, and from the Black Sea in the 
                                                 
13 Anne Christine Holden, Bulgaria’s Entrance into the First World War: A Diplomatic 
Study, 1913-1915 (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1976). 
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east to Lake Ohrid in the west, the new Bulgaria encompassed the ancient regions of 
Moesia, Macedonia and Thrace—the “traditional” Bulgarian lands—and areas in which, 
at least in the eyes of Bulgarians, the majority population was Bulgarian.  Like the 
Germans and Italians before them, Bulgarian nationalists had seen their fervent desires 
realized, as a united Bulgaria was formed along historic and ethnic lines.   
Such exuberance, however, was short-lived, due to the widespread hostility of the 
other Great Powers to the settlement.  In particular, Britain and Austria-Hungary raised 
opposition, as neither was pleased with the implications of this agreement.  They were 
afraid this new Bulgaria would be little more than a Russian puppet, jeopardizing the 
British route to India and placing additional pressure on the Dual Monarchy’s position in 
Southeastern Europe.14  Consequently, both demanded the treaty’s revision.  As the Great 
Powers chose to resolve the resulting conflict through diplomacy, Bulgaria and its patron 
were forced to accept modification of the treaty.  In June 1878, the Great Powers met in 
Berlin at the invitation of the German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck (1871-1890), who 
promised to serve as an “honest broker” in settling the disputes raised by San Stefano. 
Under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, signed 13 July 1878, the large Bulgarian polity 
that had been created just a few months before was reduced to an autonomous province 
roughly one-third of its size, truncated on all sides.  In the north, parts of the Dobrudja 
were ceded to Romania, while areas in the Morava valley in the west were given to 
Serbia.  In the south, the Thracian lands were organized into a separate region, Eastern 
Rumelia, which became a semi-autonomous province administered by the Ottomans and 
                                                 
14 Crampton, Bulgaria, p. 95. 
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forbidden from unifying with Bulgaria.  Other Bulgarian-speaking lands in the southwest 
were transferred to Serbia and territory in the southeast reverted to the Ottoman Empire.15   
During the Berlin Congress, Bulgaria found itself at the mercy of the assembled 
powers, none of which stepped forward to plead its case.  Bismarck was unconcerned 
with the affairs of the Balkan states, Russia lacked the strength and will to stand against 
Austria and Great Britain, and Italy was too focused on arranging its own affairs to 
oppose the other powers.  None of Bulgaria’s Balkan neighbors was ready to stand up for 
Sofia either.  As Serbia’s claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina were denied at Berlin (the 
lands were given to Austria-Hungary instead), Belgrade turned its attention to obtaining 
territory in the south and the east, particularly Macedonia, which was a part of the land 
acquired by the Bulgarians at San Stefano.  Nor was Greece motivated to support Sofia, 
as Athens had no desire to have a large Slavic state on its northern border, particularly 
since no noticeable territorial compensation had been offered to Greece since it won its 
independence in 1832.  Thus, according to Richard Crampton, when the Treaty of Berlin 
was finally agreed upon, the new Bulgarian state “began life with a ready-made 
irredentist programme and a bitter resentment at its treatment by the great powers.”16   
                                                 
15 San Stefano Bulgaria was thus split into three: Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, and 
Macedonia.  Now an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria was 
granted its own ruler (elected by the Bulgarians and confirmed by the Great Powers), but 
became a vassal of the Sultan, whose sovereignty it had to acknowledge.  Bulgaria also 
had to pay tribute to the Sultan and assume the Empire’s international obligations.  
Eastern Rumelia was only semi-autonomous; the Sultan held direct political and military 
authority over the region.  Day-to-day control of the province was assumed by a 
governor-general, who was appointed by the Sultan for a five-year period and was 
approved by the signatory powers at Berlin. Crampton, Bulgaria, pp. 94-95. 
16 Crampton, Concise History, p. 86.   
   
9 
While a Bulgarian state had come into being, it was not in the manner or to the 
extent hoped.  This reversal of fortune shocked Bulgarian nationalists such as Ivan 
Geshov, later the minister-president of Bulgaria (1911-1913), who wrote in his memoirs: 
When in the ominous month of July 1878, we in Plovdiv read in the Times the 
first published text of this agreement, in which short sighted diplomacy in Berlin 
partitioned our homeland, we were left crushed and thunderstruck.  Was such an 
injustice possible?  Could such an injustice be reversed?17 
 
Restoring the boundaries of San Stefano was to become one of the prime objectives of 
successive Bulgarian governments, each of which sought in its own way to garner the 
assistance of various powers to undo the injustices of the Berlin Treaty. 
 In the years following the creation of the autonomous principality of Bulgaria, 
Sofia made use of its position in Southeastern Europe to further its designs for a unified 
state along the lines of the Treaty of San Stefano.  Alternating between Russophilia and           
phobia, Bulgaria reclaimed a considerable chunk of the San Stefano lands, although 
various setbacks prevented Sofia from achieving its ultimate goal.  Following the Serbo-
Bulgarian War (1885-1886), the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia was officially 
recognized, although Prince Alexander lost his throne in the process.18  Ferdinand of 
Saxe-Coburg was chosen to replace Alexander by the Great Powers and emerged as a 
                                                 
17 Ivan F. Geshov, Spomeni iz godini na borbi i pobedi (Sofia: Gutenberg Press, 1916), p. 
94 as quoted in Hall, Bulgaria’s Road, p. 2. 
18 The Serbo-Bulgarian War was a war between Serbia and Bulgaria that began in 
response to the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia.  Although the war was fought 
between these two states, Austria-Hungary and Russia kept close watch in the 
background ready to defend their interests and those of the sides they supported (Serbia 
in the case of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria in the case of Russia). 
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central figure in Bulgaria’s bid to restore San Stefano.19  The new prince recognized his 
country needed someone to protect its people and used all his skill and cunning to do so, 
avoiding confrontations with other states and playing off their interests to Bulgaria’s 
advantage.  One of his greatest successes was taking advantage of the Young Turk 
uprising in 1908 to declare Bulgaria’s independence and the almost concomitant Bosnian 
Annexation Crisis to gain the sanction of the Great Powers.20  In the words of Winston 
Churchill, Ferdinand “combined the extremes of craft, fierceness, resolution, and 
miscalculation”21 to safeguard Bulgarian interests as he navigated the difficult minefield 
of Bismarckian power politics.  The first three of these qualities brought considerable 
success, but it was the last that proved to be the undoing of Bulgaria and its monarch. 
                                                 
19 Alexander was forced from the throne of Bulgaria as a result of a military coup led by a 
number of his officers, who felt they did not receive significant enough compensation for 
their service in the Serbian campaign.  Although a counter-revolution briefly restored the 
prince, his was unable to reassert his control over the state and formally resigned his 
throne shortly thereafter.  His replacement, Ferdinand, held the title of Prince of Bulgaria 
from 1887-1908.  When Bulgaria achieved full independence, he then received the title of 
Tsar, which he retained until his forced abdication in 1918. Stephen Constant, Foxy 
Ferdinand, Tsar of Bulgaria (New York: Franklin Watts, 1980). 
20 In September1908, in an attempt to ease tensions in the Balkans and to enhance the 
standing and prestige of their respective empires, the foreign ministers of Russia and 
Austria-Hungary agreed to the formal annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, which had administered the region since the Treaty of Berlin (1878).  
In exchange, Austria-Hungary would support Russia’s right of transit through the Turkish 
Straits.  Known as the Buchlau Bargain, Moscow and Vienna did not receive the sanction 
of the other countries of Europe to agree to such a deal, leading Europe to the brink of 
war.  Additionally, Russia and Austria-Hungary agreed that one of the outcomes of the 
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was that Bulgaria should gain its independence.  A. J. 
P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954); 
Plamen S. Tsvetkov, A History of the Balkans: A Regional Overview from a Bulgarian 
Perspective, volume 1 (San Francisco: Edward Mellen Text, 1993), Solomon Wank, In 
the Twilight of Empire: Count Alois Lexa von Aerenthal (1854-1912), Imperial Habsburg 
Patriot and Statesman (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009). 
21 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, volume 1: 1911-1914 (New York: Alfred A 
Knopf, 1936), p. 143. 
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 Following Bulgarian independence, Sofia moved closer to Russia, looking for 
more ways to strengthen its position in the Balkans and take further advantage of Turkish 
instability.  While the Young Turks claimed they would bring peace and reform to the 
administration of the Balkan Peninsula, they were unable to do so.  This failure was 
especially problematic in Albania, where the Albanians, who, like the Ottomans, were 
mostly Muslim, nonetheless chafed under the new, more centralized administration.  As a 
result, the Albanians continually rose in revolt in an attempt to secure autonomy, if not 
independence.  This behavior troubled the other Balkan states on two accounts.  First, the 
instability there might compel one or more of the Great Powers to intervene and impose 
reforms that they would oversee.  Second, should these troubles result in a more serious 
conflict, a Great Power could possibly try to secure peace through an armed intervention.   
Whatever might result from the Albanian revolts, the Balkan states recognized 
that their chances for territorial aggrandizement would be severely curtailed.  An alliance 
of the Balkan states, however, would make involvement by the Great Powers more 
difficult.  Accordingly, at the instigation of Russia, Bulgaria and Serbia began discussing 
a possible alliance.  While St. Petersburg hoped Sofia and Belgrade would form a purely 
defensive association, the two Balkan states had other ideas.  They were not interested in 
an agreement merely to preserve their countries, but rather to seize as much land from 
Turkey as possible before the Great Powers interceded to preserve Europe’s “sick man.”   
The major sticking point in the eventual agreement was Macedonia.  Bulgaria and 
Serbia both agreed to partition the land north of the Aegean, but the exact division 
remained unsettled.  The possibility also existed that Serbia and Bulgaria might need to 
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make a further arrangement with Greece, which also had a strong interest in Macedonian 
territory, but the topic was not broached in this pact.  According to their provisional 
agreement, Bulgaria would receive the area east of the Rhodopes and the Struma River 
while Serbia would acquire the land north and west of the Shar Mountains.  Both claimed 
the region around the Vardar and agreed to resolve this dispute following war with the 
Turks.  If necessary, the Russian Tsar would arbitrate the allotment of land.22  Shortly 
thereafter, Montenegro and Greece joined the alliance, although no agreement was made 
regarding territorial gains if the Turks were defeaedt.  Thus, a Balkan League directed 
against the Ottoman Empire came into existence in the spring of 1912. 
 Later that summer, the annual Albanian revolts turned especially violent, 
spreading into Macedonia as far as Skopje.  Pressure mounted in Sofia to protect the 
southwestern part of the former exarchate.23  Coupled with the difficulties the Ottomans 
were confronting in its war with Italy (the Turco-Italian/Libyan War, 1911-1912), the 
opportunity seemed ripe to strike.24  With the threat of war on two fronts, the Young 
Turks lost a vote of confidence and were forced to step down from power.  Finally, on 8 
October, as the Turco-Italian war was drawing to a close, Montenegro declared war on 
the Ottomans.  The other three members of the Balkan League followed suit a few days 
later.25  The First Balkan War had begun, lasting until the following May.  
                                                 
22 Ernst C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 55-56. 
23 For the boundaries of the Exarchate of Bulgaria granted by the Ottomans, see pp. 8-9. 
24 Timothy W. Childs, The War over Libya, 1911-1912 (Leiden: Brill, 1990). 
25 Crampton, Bulgaria, 1878-1918, pp. 407-411; Edward J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail: 
The Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, 1912-1913 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p. 86; 
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By December, the combined forces of the Balkan League overwhelmed Turkey.  
While Serbia and Montenegro pushed towards the Adriatic, hoping to annex Albania, 
Bulgaria and Greece marched towards Constantinople.  In order to shield the Ottoman 
Empire from total disaster, the Great Powers induced the Balkan League to end the war.  
A peace conference was planned in London in December, but a coup d’état in Turkey on 
23 January derailed negotiations.  Fighting broke out again between the Balkan League 
and the Ottomans, culminating with Bulgaria and Serbia’s victory at Adrianople on 13 
March.  While negotiations resumed on 22 March, the Balkan League did not formally 
accept Great Power mediation until 20 April.  All the concerned parties met again in 
London on 20 May, and the Treaty of London was signed ten days later.26 
Although the Balkan allies achieved victory in the field relatively easily, the 
formal resolution of the conflict proved trickier.  Romania had not particpated in the war, 
but, viewing the enlargement of its Balkan neighbors as a threat, demanded land in order 
to preserve the balance of power and because it did not oppose the League during the 
war.27  Compensation could only come from Bulgaria, which was forced to surrender the 
southern Dobrudja from Silistria to Balchik.28  Further trouble arose over Salonika.  In 
light of its losses in the north, Sofia sought land in other areas, regarding the procurement 
                                                                                                                                                 
John D. Treadway, The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-
1914 (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1983), pp. 105-113. 
26 Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War (New 
York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 60-68; Jacob Gould Schuman, The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1914), pp. 52-61; David G. Hermann, The Arming 
of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996), pp. 173-199. 
27 Crampton, Concise History, p. 137. 
28 Ibid. 
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of an Aegean port as one of its chief objectives.  The Greeks, however, had historical and 
ethnic claims to the city, and were the first to occupy it during the war.  This dispute drew 
in Germany and Austria as well.  Berlin favored the Greeks, as Crown Prince Constantine 
was Wilhelm II’s brother-in-law, while Vienna supported Bulgaria.  It was not until 1913 
that this matter was finally resolved in favor of Greece.29  Negotiations regarding the 
southeastern regions of the Balkans were resolved relatively easily, as Bulgaria received 
all the territory it had conquered north of the Enos-Midia line.  While Sofia preferred 
territory closer to Constantinople, it was pleased with this settlement, as it would now 
control the Eastern Thracian cities of Adrianople and Kirk-Kilisse.30 
It was the issue of land gains in the west that culminated in the Second Balkan 
War of 1913.  In the original alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria, the distribution of 
Macedonia had been left open to clarification following the successful completion of the 
war.  Due to Sofia’s territorial losses in the southern Dobrudja and Serbia’s to the newly 
formed Albania, however, both states sought to gain as much of Macedonia as possible.  
Sofia now argued for a “proportional” allotment of land, namely that each country would 
acquire territory based on how much it had contributed to the war and the number of 
casualties suffered.31  Such a policy favored Bulgaria, as it had provided more war 
materials and had suffered more casualties than either Serbia or Greece.  Belgrade and 
                                                 
29 Crampton, Bulgaria, 1878-1918, p. 415. 
30 Anatolii Nekiludov, Diplomatic Reminiscences Before and During the World War, 
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Athens, however, pushed for an equal portioning of territory, as any settlement needed to 
preserve the balance of power in the Balkans.32  Hoping to induce the Serbs and the 
Greeks to make concessions, and fearing a possible attack by Belgrade, Sofia made a 
preemptive strike on its former allies on 29 June 1913, initiating the Second Balkan War. 
Although Bulgaria enjoyed early success, the tides of war turned quickly.  By 10 
July, Romania had mobilized and moved rapidly south.  Taking advantage of this 
opportunity, the Ottoman Empire struck from the east, winning a major victory at 
Adrianople and regaining territory in Eastern Thrace.  Under attack on all sides, Bulgaria 
was forced to sue for peace.  This defeat crushed Bulgarian morale and cost Sofia a 
considerable chunk of land.  The Treaty of Bucharest, signed 10 August 1913, settled the 
disputes over Macedonia to the satisfaction of the Serbs and Greeks at the expense of 
most of the territory Bulgaria had acquired a few months prior.33  Sofia retained just a 
sliver of Pirin Macedonia through half of the Struma River valley, small portions of 
Thrace around Gyumyurdjina and Kurdjali and a small portion of the Aegean coastline 
that included the port of Dedeagach.  What perhaps hurt the most was the surrender of the 
port of Kavalla.  According to Holden, “the Struma valley [in which Kavalla was located] 
provided the natural access to the Aegean for Bulgarian products, and the Macedonian 
hinterland had a predominately Bulgarian population.”34  Furthermore, the loss of 
Kavalla meant that Dedeagach would be Bulgaria’s only Aegean port and that any 
railways connected to it now meandered through foreign land.  With Kavalla under its 
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control, Bulgaria would have had a network of rail lines running through its own 
territory, making the transport of goods cheaper and more secure.  Having lost the city, 
Bulgaria’s best hope for regaining it came from a proposal made by Austria that the 
Treaty of Bucharest be revised at a later date. 
The Treaty of Constantinople, signed 10 September 1913, ended the conflict 
between Turkey and Bulgaria, and stripped Bulgaria of even more of the land it had 
recently acquired.  During the Second Balkan War, the Turks re-conquered much of 
Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople.  Bulgaria was desperate to retain this city, but once 
again the Great Powers frustrated its wishes.  Although the German government initially 
supported a settlement along the Enos-Midia line, Kaiser Wilhelm “hope[d] that the city 
would be returned to the Porte.”35  Russia and Austria-Hungary, usually adversaries on 
Balkan matters, were both willing to urge Turkey to withdraw from Adrianople so that it 
might “pull back into Asia Minor and try to consolidate herself there,” but St. Petersburg 
withdrew its support of Bulgaria in order to break the diplomatic stalemate.36  With its 
ally Germany squarely on the side of the Ottomans, Vienna’s tentative efforts came to 
naught.  When the treaty was finally signed, Bulgaria’s border now followed the Maritsa 
River, resulting in the surrender not only of Adrianople, but also Kirk-Kilisse.   
At the end of the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria was devastated.  It had suffered 
immense casualties and, for the second time in its recent history, seen a partition of its 
territory. While its Balkan neighbors were more or less satisfied, Sofia was anything but.  
                                                 
35 Alfred Zimmerman to Prince Karl Max von Lichnowsky, 7 August 1913, Politisches 
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Bulgaria had increased its population and territorial expanse since unification in 1885, 
but, according to Holden, “not as much as she had hoped, and not in the right places.”37  
Southern Dobrudja, with its rich farmland had been the county’s chief source of grain for 
export.  Its loss was an unmitigated disaster.  Even the regions that Bulgaria had been 
permitted to retain could not compensate since they were highly underdeveloped.  
Bulgaria also lost control of any of river mouths that flowed through these lands.  While 
Dedeagach was an Aegean port, it was not especially useful.  If Sofia were to make full 
use of this city, it would need to build new rail lines and a harbor at Porto Lagos. 
Despite these setbacks, Bulgaria became an important piece on the European 
diplomatic chessboard.  The Great Powers recognized that Bulgaria, while not a strong 
Euopean force, was a land of strategic importance, whose interests, actions, and desires 
had to be taken into consideration.  Bulgaria had been engaged in two relatively major 
wars that further weakened Turkish power and redrew the borders of Southeastern 
Europe.  Yet all of this came at a high price.  Bulgaria was now surrounded by hostile 
states that had had their appetites whetted for territory and desired even more.  
Additionally, Sofia believed its main ally, Russia, had abandoned it, for St. Petersburg 
proved either unwilling or unable to support the desires of its Slavic brother.  This 
development increased the possibility of a closer arrangement with Vienna, however, 
since Austria had backed Sofia’s claims to Salonika and Kavalla and had proposed a 
revision of the Treaty of Bucharest.  Furthermore, Vienna had assisted in the negotiations 
at Constantinople, even though the final provisions of the treaty were not wholly 
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satisfactory.  A closer connection was still a long way off, however, due to the existing 
alliance between Austria and Romania and Kaiser Wilhelm’s preference for his cousin 
the Romanian King Carol I.38  While an agreement with Bulgaria would not directly 
conflict with Austria’s commitments to Romania, it would further stress an already 
strained relationship, given Romania’s ambitions for Transylvania.  Nevertheless, the 
groundwork had been laid for a possible understanding with the Triple Alliance. 
 On the eve of World War I, Bulgaria had been weakened by two wars and largely 
dissatisfied by the final settlement, with little hope for any drastic improvement in its 
situation.  Without a dramatic change in European power politics, Sofia could do little to 
achieve its aspirations for Balkan predominance and unification of Bulgaria along the 
lines of San Stefano.  The assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand provided just 
such an opportunity.  It would take considerable skill and a little bit of luck to turn things 
in its favor, but a new chance now appeared to undo the disasters of the Balkan Wars.
                                                 
38 Carol I had been the leader of Romania since 1866.  As a result of the 1881 Treaty of 
Berlin, Romania gained its independence from the Ottomans and Carol became King 
until his death in September/October 1914.  Carol I was a member of the House of 
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which Wilhelm II belonged.  Carol was chosen to be the king of Romania due to his 
dynastic connections with both the powerful state of Prussia and the Bonaparte family, 
then in control of France.  Jelavich, History of the Balkans, volume 2, pp. 23-28. 
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Chapter I  
Prelude to the Great War: The Stance of the Power Groups and the Loan of 1914 
 
 As 1913 rolled into 1914, Bulgaria lay on the periphery of the plans of both major 
Great Power alliance constellations.  While members of the Triple Alliance and Triple 
Entente assayed the benefits that might accrue from Bulgaria’s support, it seemed too 
troublesome and unreliable to be pursued actively.  Moreover, given Bulgaria’s position 
in the wake of the Treaty of Constantinople, Sofia felt betrayed and abandoned by the 
major states of Europe.  Nevertheless, due to Bulgaria’s strategic location, the Great 
Powers could not afford to ignore this Balkan land.  Despite its defeat in the Second 
Balkan War, Bulgaria had demonstrated considerable military prowess in both Balkan 
campaigns.  How the powers viewed Bulgaria at this time, in particular Germany and 
Great Britain (as the respective leaders of their alliance systems), and how Bulgaria tried 
to rebuild itself after the catastrophe of the Balkan Wars is significant in understanding 
how the courtship of this country proceeded in the opening year of World War I. 
 In regards to Bulgaria, and the Balkans in general, Britain preferred to avoid 
decisive action, having its own concerns about Germany.  Nevertheless, London did 
recognize Bulgaria’s importance and value.  Its location on the European side of the 
Turkish Straits meant that, should Sofia be hostile, access to Russia could be impeded, if 
not blocked completely.1  Consequently, some in the British cabinet, led by Winston 
Churchill, the first lord of the admiralty (1911-1915), pushed for an understanding with 
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Bulgaria in order to create a buffer between the Central Powers and Turkey and reduce 
any pressure that could be put on Russia.2  Russia’s interest in Bulgaria was also limited 
at this point, although St. Petersburg recognized its potential as an ally.  When Alexander 
Savinsky was dispatched to Sofia in January 1914 to serve as the new ambassador, Serge 
Sazonov, the Russian minister for foreign affairs (1910-1916), warned him “not to run 
the risk of alienating the king and pushing Bulgaria towards the Germanic powers.”3  Its 
relationship with Bulgaria may have been severely damaged by recent events, but Russia 
was not foolish enough to abandon its former protégé.   
Despite cooler relations after the Balkan Wars, St. Petersburg remained confident 
in long-term Bulgarian Russophilia, believing that Bulgaria would always be grateful to 
Russia for helping secure its independence.4  Furthermore, as the new government in 
Sofia needed to secure funds to pay off its country’s debts, many Bulgarians hoped 
Russia would provide this aid.5, St. Petersburg, however, was slow to offer financial 
support, resulting in a less than favorable perception by the Bulgarian populace.  This 
was coupled with the foreign policy of Bulgaria’s new prime minister, Vasil Radoslavov, 
                                                 
2 Churchill, World Crisis, volume 1, p. 265. 
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whose policies were neither overly pro- or anti-Russian.6  This moderate position 
received widespread approval from Bulgarians, who supported a more independent 
nationalist program in the wake of the interference of the Great Powers in Bulgarian 
affairs during and after the Balkan Wars.7 
 As Bulgaria began to pursue its own policy independent of outside influences, 
both France and Russia became concerned Radoslavov was beginning to favor the Dual 
Monarchy, as Vienna had supported Bulgarian interests during the negotiation of the 
Treaties of Bucharest and Constantinople.8  Radoslavov’s election as Prime Minister did 
little to calm these fears, as he had always supported a stronger connection with Vienna, 
despite his relatively neutral stance regarding Russia.  Their fears only increased when 
military supplies from Austria arrived in Bulgaria in April 1913 amid talks between 
Radoslavov and Count Adam Tarnowski von Tarnow, the Habsburg minister at Sofia 
(1911-1917).  Bulgaria’s interest in the Triple Alliance should not have come as much of 
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a surprise, since Russia had begun to favor Serbia and, to a lesser extent, Romania.9  
Furthermore, while Bulgaria’s desire for land in the southeast conflicted with Russian 
designs, this was not an issue for Vienna, which had territorial concerns with Bulgaria’s 
northern and western neighbors. 
 With a stronger connection developing between Sofia and Vienna, the door was 
open for Germany and Austria-Hungary to take advantage.  That Serbia was increasingly 
becoming a thorn in the Dual Monarchy’s side following the Balkan Wars only served to 
make matters more pressing.  Serbia’s recent victories and territorial gains not only gave 
hope to the Slavs in the Habsburg lands that they might win their freedom, but also to 
those outside the Empire who coveted Hapsburg land.  With Radoslavov and Tsar 
Ferdinand not disposed to a Russian alliance, Vienna’s position was favorable.  
According to Graf Leopold von Berchtold, the Austrian foreign minister (1911-1915), 
“Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria have a similar interest, to prevent an immense increase in 
the power of Serbia.”  Consequently, Vienna came to believe that “if matters should once 
more come to the settlement of the Serbian question, then Bulgaria making common 
cause with the Monarchy would be—in this respect—of even greater value.”10 
It was Sofia that first attempted to reach an understanding with Vienna.  As soon 
as he came to power in March 1913, Radoslavov made a formal offer of alliance.11  
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Another proposal came in late July of the same year when Nikola Genadiev, Bulgaria’s 
foreign secretary (1913-1914), approached Tarnowski:12 
In case Austria-Hungary is still interested in a permanent and formal alliance with 
Bulgaria, the Bulgarian government considers the present moment to be favorable 
to act, not only because at present Russia is falling in public esteem, but also 
because in the current painful crisis Bulgaria has to know that its salvation must 
come from Vienna.13 
 
The Ballhausplatz was receptive, but only up to a point.  Tarnowski informed Genadiev 
that he had to consult with the other members of the Triple Alliance before proceeding.  
As a sign of good faith, Tarnowski recommended that Bulgaria should come to some sort 
of an understanding with Romania.14  While a Bulgarian-Romanian agreement would 
benefit the Dual Monarchy by limiting Russian influence, Vienna did not regard a treaty 
between Sofia and Bucharest as a prerequisite for an Austro-Bulgarian pact. 
 The prospect of a stronger connection with Bulgaria was also appealing to 
Vienna-and thus its close partner in European affairs, Berlin-in that it might bring 
Constantinople closer to the Triple Alliance.  Turkey certainly was attractive in that it 
could contain Russia by blockading the Turkish Straits, effectively cutting Russia off 
from its Allies.   Nevertheless Turkey still appeared too weak to defend itself, placing a 
potentially large burden on the Dreibund.  As Gottlieb von Jagow, Germany’s foreign 
secretary (1911-1915), informed his ambassadors in Vienna and Constantinople, an 
agreement with Turkey would be dangerous “because of inevitable demands, incapable of 
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fulfillment, for counterperformance on our part.”15  Hans von Wangenheim, Germany’s 
ambassador to Constantinople (1913-1916), concurred, stating that the Triple Alliance 
“could not defend Turkey against everybody.”16  An agreement between Sofia and 
Constantinople would have to overcome recent animosity, but such a connection would 
be beneficial to the Triple Alliance.  Since Sofia was pro-Austrian, a Bulgarian-Turkish 
connection would likely guarantee Turkish friendship.  Berlin and Vienna did not pursue 
this line until July 1914, but the potential rewards of a bond between Bulgaria and Turkey 
was an important factor in their Balkan policy. 
 Tsar Ferdinand also played a leading role in promoting a closer relationship 
between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria.  It was customary in the months of August and 
September for Ferdinand to travel through Central Europe, and during his trip in 1913, he 
discussed matters of foreign policy with Berchtold and Emperor Francis Joseph while he 
was in Vienna.  Ferdinand pushed hard for an alliance, but Austria showed little 
interest.17  The Bulgarian tsar even went so far as to insist Bulgaria started the Second 
Balkan War in defense of Bulgarian and Austrian interests, but no agreement resulted.18   
Further hindering Bulgaria’s attempts to arrange an alliance with Austria was the 
attitude of Vienna’s main ally, Germany.  Although Bismarck’s Germany had generally 
favored maintaining a relatively low profile in the Balkans, the accession of William II 
changed this policy considerably.   With the threat of Germany being encircled by its 
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enemies becoming more palpable from 1905 onwards, Berlin intensified its activities in 
the east by providing military aid and training to Turkey.  In doing so, Germany had been 
able to build a stronger relationship with the Turks, thus safeguarding Austria-Hungary’s 
flank and keeping Russia and the Entente in check.19  Even so, Berlin followed a policy 
of limiting direct involvement in the rest of southeastern Europe.  Following the Bosnian 
Crisis, Berlin and London agreed to limit their interference in the affairs of the Near East 
and strive to maintain peace between the Great Powers should any disputes arise.20 
Bulgaria was a relatively low priority for the Wilhelmstrasse, which preferred an 
alliance with Greece.  Berlin saw Athens as important from both a strategic and a 
personal angle.  Constantine, the King of Greece, was Wilhelm II’s brother-in-law, and 
the kaiser hoped to avoid fighting a war against him.21  From a strategic perspective, 
Berlin believed an alliance between Greece and the Triple Alliance “[spoke] to both the 
Dreibund’s position in the Mediterranean, as well as German interests in the Near East,” 
as France and Britain would have trouble moving goods and men due to its hostility.22  
This would also pressure Turkey to stay friendly to the Triplice, effectively cutting 
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Russia off from the Entente.  Consequently, Germany felt it much more in Vienna’s 
interest to pursue an alliance with Greece.23 
Maintaining Romanian support was also more important to Germany than a 
Bulgarian alliance, given Romania’s position on Russia’s border and the complicated 
connections between Bucharest and Vienna.  The loss of Romania as an ally would 
seriously harm the Dual Monarchy, as it would have another enemy along its long eastern 
border.  Bulgarian-Romanian relations were certainly at a low following the Balkan Wars 
and Jagow felt that the Triple Alliance could not risk losing Romania at the price of 
Bulgaria, particularly since he found Bulgaria to be inconstant and untrustworthy.24  If, 
however, Bucharest and Sofia could somehow reach an agreement, a union between the 
Dreibund and Bulgaria might become more realistic.25  Furthermore, as in the case of 
Greece, Wilhelm also had a familial interest in Romania.26 
 While Berchtold was confident that Bulgaria could be won over without 
alienating Romania, other Habsburg leaders shared Jagow’s concerns.  Berchtold faced 
opposition particularly from Count Ladislaus Szögyény, the Habsburg ambassador in 
Berlin.  Szögyény was particularly wary of gaining one ally only to lose another, forcing 
Berchtold to reassure him “it would be thoroughly impossible and unsuccessful…to favor 
Bulgaria at the cost of [Austria’s] position in Romania.”  Nevertheless, Berchtold felt a 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Jagow to Foreign Office, 13 November 1913, Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen 
Kabinette 1871-1914; Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes 
(hereinafter cited as GP), edited by Johannes Leipsis, volume 35, Der Dritte Balkankrieg 
1913 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1924) p. 58. 
25 Wangenheim to Jagow, 13 May 1914, ibid. 
26 cf. Introduction, footnote 37. 
   
27 
“small affiliation on the part of Bulgaria to the Dreibund” was necessary, reminding his 
ambassador “there exists an agreement of our inclinations and those of Bulgaria, namely 
that the prevention of the achievement of a Greater Serbia is in the vital interests of both 
sides, a development, which we can not sit back and watch if the occasion should 
arise.”27  The dispute became so bitter, in fact, that Berchtold informed Szögyény that 
prolonging this disagreement would endanger the Triple Alliance itself since Germany 
was receiving mixed messages about Vienna’s policy regarding Bulgaria.28   
Compelling though Berchtold’s arguments might have been, Szögyény’s doubts 
remained.  Austria was willing to keep every option open, however, and, should Vienna 
be able to gain a stronger foothold in Bulgaria, it would discuss an offer of alliance.  If 
Sofia joined with Austria and the Dreibund, Romania would be more likely to stay in the 
fold.29  A rapprochement between Sofia and Bucharest had significant hurdles, but the 
possibility that Romania might be convinced to ease tensions with Bulgaria seemed 
possible.  Vienna and Sofia both recognized the possibilities of an agreement, but their 
attempts to reach one on political grounds failed.  While sharing common interests, a 
concrete policy had yet to develop that would make an alliance a reality. 
 Bulgaria’s financial needs in the wake of the Balkan Wars served as a new 
opportunity to win over Sofia.  One of the most important tasks confronting the new 
Radoslavov government was procuring capital to restore Bulgaria’s fiscal health.  A loan 
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agreement might secure Bulgarian friendship, and Russia and Austria-Hungary–which 
individually lacked the financial strength to offer such aid–placed considerable pressure 
on their allies to generate the necessary funds for Bulgaria. 
 As soon as the Treaty of Bucharest had been signed, the Bulgarian government 
began to search for a loan to help pay off the debts that had accrued as a result of the 
Balkan Wars, a sum totaling 250 million francs.30  Although Austria provided a short-
term loan of 30 million francs, Vienna was reluctant to make further investments, 
particularly anything long-term.  As France had had a long history of investing in 
Bulgaria, Dimitar Tonchev, the Bulgarian minister of finance, sought out the Banque de 
Paris et Pays Bas in August 1913 and asked for an advance of 75 million francs.  Paris, 
however, was not interested in providing a loan until Bulgaria had ended its war with the 
Ottomans and Russia supported a French offer of financial assistance.31  The latter 
condition turned the Bulgarian monetary issue into a diplomatic one.  While France was 
willing to extend a loan, St. Petersburg saw the impending financial crisis as a means of 
forcing Radoslavov out of power, and, perhaps, bringing Bulgaria back into closer 
alignment with Russia and the Entente.32  With both Austria and France unwilling to 
provide the terms Bulgaria sought, however, 1913 ended with its debts unresolved. 
                                                 
30 Crampton, Bulgaria, p. 213. 
31 Alexandre Ribot (Prime Minister of France, 1914-1915) to Stéphen Pichon (French 
Foreign Minister, 1913), 2 November 1913, DDF, 1871-1914, Series 3, volume 8, p. 426; 
Izvolsky to Genadiev, 2 November 1913, as quoted in Herbert Feis, Europe the World’s 
Banker, 1870-1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 271. 
32 Hall, Bulgaria’s Road, p. 280. 
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 In February 1914, Bulgaria again approached France about a loan, but Paris still 
attached too many unfavorable conditions.33  Additionally, Paris informed Sofia that the 
state of the French domestic market would prohibit the consideration of a foreign loan 
until the end of the year, at the earliest.34  The hard conditions were the result of Russian 
pressure to draw Bulgaria back to its side.  Despite the efforts made by St. Petersburg and 
Alexander Savinsky, “this brow-beating,” in the words of Keith Robbins, “had the effect 
of driving the Bulgarian government once again in the direction of the Central Powers 
and negotiations for a large loan were opened in Berlin” at the end of February.35   
Austria-Hungary, meanwhile, continued to press for a financial agreement, 
viewing the loan as a means of achieving its goals in the Balkans while still having 
German support since a loan would not require a military convention.36  Berlin pledged to 
oppose attempts by France or Russia to force Bulgaria to accept unfavorable terms, and 
Michahelles, who admitted he was “cool and aloof towards the Bulgars,” actively 
engaged financiers in Hamburg in order to secure a loan agreement.37  By the middle of 
                                                 
33 These terms included Bulgaria taking responsibility for some of the Ottoman Empire’s 
debts and the settlement of disputes between French and Bulgarian citizens.  Bulgaria 
also would have to utilize French companies for the building of railroads and harbors and 
purchase French arms and munitions.  Department note, conditions for a Bulgarian loan, 
16 February 1914, DDF 1871-1914, volume 9, 1 Janvier-16 Mars 1914, number 306. 
34 De Margerie (Foreign Ministry official) to Panafieu, 30 March 1914, DDF 1871-1914, 
series 3, volume 10, 17 Mars-23 Juli, number 45.  Also, Hall, Bulgaria’s Road, p. 266.  
35 Keith Robbins, “British Diplomacy and Bulgaria, 1914-1915,” The Slavonic and East 
European Review, vol. 49, no. 117 (October 1971), p. 564. 
36 Jagow to Szögyény, 10 April, 1914, AA-PA, R 1922, Fiche J, Series 14656, IA 
Deutschland 128, Nr. 8 secr., band 1. 
37 Michahelles, im Kaiserlischen Dienst, pp. 152-153. 
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March, the German government, recognizing that monetary aid would draw Bulgaria 
closer to the Triple Alliance, agreed to support a loan backed by German banks.38 
As much as Germany understood the benefits of a successful loan agreement, 
France and Russia also knew what was at stake.  As Wangenheim reported to the German 
Foreign Office, Sofia believed the loan issue was becoming a major pawn in a bid by 
France and Russia to manipulate the Bulgarian goverment:  
There is great trepidation in Sofia that France, under the influence of Alexander 
Izvolsky,39 is eager to drive Bulgaria back into the arms of Russia.  Bulgaria will 
oppose this pressure as long as possible.  If it is not supported, there is no doubt 
that it will be the goal of Russia to topple the present government in Sofia in order 
to reach their goal.40 
 
With this in mind, Berlin redoubled its efforts to keep Sofia away from the Entente, even 
considering an alliance that would unite Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, the three Balkan 
states with the closest ties to the Triple Alliance.  While it would take some effort to 
accomplish this, Wangenheim, Michahelles, and Heinrich von Waldburg were certain 
they could do so.41  While Jagow put this plan on hold, it was clear that Bulgaria had now 
become a state of some importance to both Great Power alliance groups.42 
                                                 
38 Kölnische Zeitung, 14 March 1914. 
39 Alexander Izvolsky had been the Russian ambassador to Paris since 1910.  He is 
perhaps best remembered for negotiating the Buchlau Bargain in 1908 with Baron Alois 
Lexa von Aehrenthal, which resulted in the Bosnain Annexation Crisis.  Izvolsky also 
arranged Russia’s entente with Britain in 1907.  Following his dismissal as foreign 
minister, he devoted himself to strengthening Russia’s bond with both France and Britain.  
Albertini, Origins of the War of 1914, volume 1, pp. 201-208. 
40 Wangenheim to Jagow, 10 April 1914, AA-PA, R 1922, Fiche J, Series 14656, IA 
Deutschland 128, Nr. 8 secr., band 1. 
41 Wangenheim to Jagow, 7 May 1914, AA-PA, R 1922, Fiche J, Series 14656, IA 
Deutschland 128, Nr. 8 secr., band 1.  Heinrich von Waldburg zu Wolfegg und Waldsee 
served as the chargé d’Affaires in Bucharest from 1912 to 1916.  
42 Robbins, “British Diplomacy,” p. 565. 
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 France and Russia did not remain idle.  Both states did everything in their power 
to prevent a monetary agreement between Sofia and Berlin, since the failure to acquire a 
loan would likely force Radoslavov and his government to resign.43  Alexander Savinsky, 
the Russian minister in Sofia, published anonymous articles in pro-Russian Bulgarian 
newspapers, warning of the problems of German fiscal support, as the loss of Russian aid 
would be calamitous.44  Additionally, during visits with Bulgarian officials, he reminded 
them of the debts to Russia and France Bulgaria had incurred during the Balkan Wars.  If 
Sofia should receive German assistance, Paris and St. Petersburg would be less forgiving 
regarding repayment of these financial obligations.45 
 As the loan issue heated up, Sofia’s importance to the Great Powers increased as 
well, such that its position in mid-1914 was the opposite of what it had been just a year 
prior.  As Noel Buxton, Member of Parliament, president of the British Balkan 
Committee, and one of the leading experts of Bulgaria, commented, 
Bulgaria was no longer a defeated state abandoned and rejected by the Great 
Powers.  The loan issue transformed Bulgaria into an object of desire actively 
courted by the Great Powers.  Bulgaria’s diplomatic isolation was over.  Both 
Great Power alliances altered their previous stances towards Sofia [making] the 
loan…a weapon for the Entente to wield against the Radoslavov government.46 
 
It may not have been the manner in which it had planned, but Bulgaria was back on track 
to fulfilling its national ambitions.  Now Sofia hoped it might find support for its 
                                                 
43 Hector Panifieu to Savinsky 27 January 1914, IB, series I, volume 2: 14. März bis 15. 
Mai 1914, number 268.  Panifieu was the French ambassador at Sofia, 1912-1915. 
44 Alexander Savinsky, Reflections from a Russian Diplomat (London: Hutchinson, 
1927), pp. 216-217. 
45 Alexander Savinsky, Reflections pp. 215-216.  Savinsky to Sazonov, 27 April 1914, IB, 
series I, volume 2, p. 307. 
46 T. P. Conwall-Evans, Foreign Policy from a Back Bench, 1904-1918: A Study Based 
on the Papers of Lord Noel Buxton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 67. 
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territorial interests.  At the very least, it was in a position to push its own long-term 
agenda. 
 Despite the best efforts of Savinsky and others to discourage Bulgaria, the basic 
facets of a loan agreement with Germany were in place by the end of April.  Michahelles 
had initially arranged for the Hamburg-based Warburg Firm to provide the necessary 
funds, but Sofia required more money than Warburg could grant.  In order to bridge the 
financial shortcoming, Michahelles used his influence with the Diskonto Gesellschaft, 
which began negotiations in earnest.47  While these talks were progressing, the Reich 
maintained its distance.  William, who had little interest in becoming mixed up in this 
affair, issued orders to the Jagow that, while the Wilhelmstrasse should remain supportive 
of a loan agreement, it was to give the banks a free hand in their negotiations.48   
In response, Savinsky made two personal visits to Ferdinand within a period of 
three weeks.  In the first meeting on 11 May, he informed the tsar that France had agreed 
to offer a personal loan and forgive the repayment of earlier debts.  In return, Radoslavov 
and his ministry were to be dismissed.49  Ferdinand did not dismiss Savinsky’s offer 
outright, but, as no money was immediately forthcoming, the tsar turned once more to 
Berlin, which he hoped would be raising the proposed funds.  In the second visit on 5 
June, the Russian minister warned Ferdinand that the loan would make Bulgaria overly 
dependent on Germany and proposed a new government be put into place that would 
                                                 
47 Michahelles, Im kaiserlichen Dienst, p. 153. 
48 Silberstein, Troubled Alliance, pp. 22-23. 
49 Savinsky to Sazonov, 29 May 1914, IB, series I, volume 3: 15. Mai bis 27. Juni 1914, 
p. 116. 
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break off negotiations with the Reich and turn to France.50  Savinsky assured the tsar that 
Paris was willing to offer favorable terms and even an advance on the debts due soon.51   
Savinsky even made an appeal for British intercession, seeking out Sir Henry 
Bax-Ironside, Whitehall’s representative in Sofia, prior to meeting with Ferdinand on 11 
May.  Grey chose not to intervene, basing his decision on his ambassador’s observations 
that “the Sofia cabinet is clearly orientated to the Triple Alliance” and that “although 
harsh, Bulgaria would likely accept the terms of the German loan, as nothing else has 
been offered to them.” 52   Instead, he asked Bax-Ironside to remind Radoslavov 
unofficially that acceptance of the German loan would be unwise, as this decision would 
hinder Bulgaria’s efforts in foreign markets under French control.53   
Savinsky’s interference, however, did not provoke much indignation from 
Radoslavov, due to the unexpectedly harsh conditions of the German offer.  Under its 
terms, Bulgaria would receive 500 million francs in two installments, to be repaid within 
five years at a rate of five percent interest.54  To back the loan, the government would 
spend a significant portion of its military budget on German goods, use German 
                                                 
50 Hall, Bulgaria’s Road, p. 268. 
51 Savinsky to Sazonov, 11 June 1914, IB, series 1, volume 3, p.121 and Note from the 
Russian Embassy, 12 June 1914, DDF, volume 10, number 357.  See also, Report by 
Tarnowski, 12 June 1914, ÖUA, volume 8, number 9850. 
52 Sir Henry Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey, 10 May 1914, British Documents on 
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companies to build a new rail system to Dedeagach and surrender control of the tobacco 
industry to Germany.  The loss of this industry was the most crushing term, as tobacco 
was one of Bulgaria’s largest and most valuable exports, whose revenue had often been 
used in the past to pay off state debts.55  As a result, negotiations reached a standstill.   
It was only through the tireless efforts of Jagow and Berchtold that discussions 
did not fall apart completely, although Michahelles clearly believed “Bulgaria was 
stalling, trying to force [Berlin’s] hand into relaxing some of the terms of the loan.”56  
Germany felt additional pressure to close the deal since Sofia was making new overtures 
to Russia.  Savinsky was eager for a rapprochement, as he was convinced that a loan from 
Berlin would only spell trouble: “Bulgaria’s joining the Triple Alliance…would undercut 
or neutralize Romanian adherence to the Entente.”57  Nevertheless, this courtship was 
short-lived.  In the middle of June, Tsar Nicholas II paid a visit to Constanța in order to 
accept the honorary command of a local regiment, which had served with great 
distinction in the Second Balkan War and had occupied Silistria after Bulgaria was 
obliged to cede the city to Romania.  Nicholas’ move was highly unpopular in Bulgaria 
and prompted the government to abandon its attempts to move closer to Russia. 
 On 12 June, after a visit to Berlin, Tonchev presented Radoslavov with a new 
offer whose terms were slightly softened.  Germany now agreed to construct a harbor at 
                                                 
55 In comparision to the French and Austrian proposals, the German terms were only a 
slight improvement.  Neither Paris nor Vienna required Bulgaria to surrender control of 
the tobacco industry, but Germany offered more funds at a lower interest rate. The lower 
rates as well as support in modernizing Bulgaria’s rail network, however, proved highly 
appealing; Holden, Bulgaria’s Entrance, p. 73. 
56 Michahelles, Im kaiserlichen Dienst, p. 154. 
57 Savnisky to Sazonov, 13 June 1914, IB series 1, volume 3, number 233. 
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Porto Lagos on the Aegean coast (in April, it would only provide financing for it) and 
would only have privileges in the tobacco industry, rather than a monopoly.58  The terms 
were still stringent, however, and Bulgaria ran the risk of German money dominating its 
economy.  Acceptance of the loan was delayed because of the late offer made by the 
French Banque Perier on 16 June as well as the assassination of Francis Ferdinand twelve 
days later.  Although Ferdinand was pleased by the terms of the French bid, newspapers 
such as The Times of London felt that “it would be difficult…to take the Anglo-French 
proposals into consideration as they are so late.”59  As a result, Radoslavov tried to push 
the loan through the Bulgarian sobranje on 15 July. 60  Acceptance of the offer, however, 
was anything but peaceful.  Drawing upon eyewitness accounts, The Times reported 
numerous fist-fights [broke out], and Radoslavov himself was seen brandishing a 
revolver.  The bill was not even read, but was considered passed by a show of 
hands; many government deputies raised both hands, and some police who were 
supposedly guarding the chamber were counted among those supporting the bill.61 
   
Bulgaria, in desperate need of funds for the better part of a year, finally secured the 
money it needed. 
 The loan agreement was a triumph of Austro-German diplomacy that greatly 
pleased Jagow and Berchtold.  Although Radoslavov soundly denied any political 
significance to the loan in interviews with the press, most believed the contrary.  Not only 
did Sofia secure German capital, but it also formed a stronger bond with the Triple 
                                                 
58 At the urging of Tschirsky amd Szögyény, Berlin accommodated Sofia regarding the 
tobacco industry.  Rather than exert full control over it, Germany now agreed to support 
the construction of tobacco depots and storage warehouses and would collect a 20% duty 
on whatever tobacco was sold there.  Holden, Bulgaria’s Entrance, p. 66. 
59 The Times (London), 25 June 1914. 
60 The sobranje is the unicameral national assembly of Bulgaria. 
61 The Times (London), 16 July 1915. 
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Alliance, particularly since the conclusion of a loan meant the retention of the 
Radoslavov cabinet, which favored the continuation of a pro-Central Powers foreign 
policy.62  Furthermore, Bulgaria also began to receive a steady influx of horses, guns, and 
munitions from Vienna, significantly assisting in its rearmament.  Although it still had a 
long way to go before joining Germany and Austria-Hungary in a formal military 
alliance, Sofia had certainly started along that path. 
 Due to France’s and Russia’s muddled policy and Britain’s inactivity, a golden 
opportunity slipped through the Entente’s fingers.  While Ferdinand was wary of 
Germany’s stringent terms, Radoslavov’s Austrophilia and the lack of a strong Entente 
offer outweighed the tsar’s convictions.  Furthermore, Russia and France had once again 
tried to interfere in Bulgarian internal affairs which Ferdinand and Radoslavov found 
distasteful, driving them further away from the Entente.  Indeed, the terms of the German 
loan—which had been agreed to only because of strong Austrian pressure on the German 
government first to locate willing financiers and then soften some of their initial 
conditions—were more stringent.  Nevertheless, throughout the negotiations, Austria-
Hungary and Germany adopted a fairer, less patronizing tone, strengthening their bonds 
with Bulgaria in the process.  As a result, on the eve of war, Bulgaria had turned away 
from its traditional allies and found itself more closely oriented with Berlin and Vienna.
                                                 
62 Silberstein, Troubled Alliance, p. 24. 
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Chapter II 
 The Descent into War: The First Attempts to Draw in Bulgaria 
 
 As a result of the German loan, on the eve of Francis Ferdinand’s assassination, 
Bulgaria had drawn closer to the Triple Alliance.  Still, it was not close to entering into a 
formal alliance.  After the start of World War I, however, Sofia’s relationship with the 
Great Powers changed, as these states showed even greater interest in it.  Not only did 
Bulgaria’s position relative to the Straits and Serbia give it great strategic value, but both 
sides also knew that Bulgaria’s actions would strongly influence the stances of Greece 
and Romania, whose ultimate allegiances were still in doubt.1  Bulgaria was in a 
favorable position, and made use of this situation to determine not only whether it should 
even join the war, but also with whom and at what price.   
Although Bulgaria possibly could have asked for all of the land its desired at the 
outset of hostilities, the government displayed both restraint and prudence in its territorial 
claims, seeking lands that offered economic growth and were reasonable to expect as 
compensation.  Furthermore, Sofia only asked for territories in which Bulgarians formed 
the majority of the population.2  As The Times reported, both Alliance groups recognized 
[that] whatever concessions Bulgaria may be induced to make in other directions, 
it is certain she will never abandon her claims to the districts in Western 
Macedonia [including Monastir, Ochrida and Dibra] already assigned to her by 
the Treaty [of alliance] with Serbia [in 1912].  On this point the whole nation is 
unanimous, from the King to the humblest peasant.3   
 
                                                 
1 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, volume 2, pp. 117-118. 
2 Simeon Danianov, “Bulgaria’s Decision to Enter the War,” p. 161.  
3 The Times (London), 22 May 1913. 
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Bulgaria held the upper hand due to its strategic importance, but Sofia would not press 
for too much until it could be certain that it could gain exactly what it wanted. 
 During July 1914, both Berlin and Vienna made a concerted effort to shore up 
their position in the Balkans.  Early in the month, the prevalent feeling in Germany was 
that any conflict would be short lived and only the Dual Monarchy and Serbia would 
come to blows.4  Jagow even wrote in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung “that the conflict 
which could result between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, should remain localized.”5  By 
the end of July, however, it became clear the dispute might engulf a wider area.6  In the 
event that the war should spread, Austria recognized it would be in a much stronger 
position if the other Balkan states were on the side of the Central Powers.  Consequently, 
Vienna wanted to ask Romania to clarify its stance towards the Central Powers as well as 
secure Bulgarian and Turkish support in order to isolate Serbia.  Although William II was 
uncertain about a Bulgarian alliance, Alfred Zimmermann supported approaching 
Bulgaria about an alliance.7  He instructed Michahelles:  
Your Excellency is authorized, to support any steps of your Austro-Hungarian 
colleagues in this regard according to their desire.  It will also add to the impact, 
if, in the management of the matter, the eagerness on the part of the Dreibund is 
particularly avoided and if the union of Bulgaria desired by us in and of itself is 
portrayed as essential to Bulgarian interests.8 
 
                                                 
4 Silberstein, Troubled Alliance, pp. 26-27. 
5 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 July 1914. 
6 Silberstein, Troubled Alliance, p. 29. 
7 Zimmerman, the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, was acting as foreign 
minister while Jagow was on leave at this time. 
8 Zimmerman to Michahelles, 6 July 1914, AA-PA, R 1922, Fiche J, Series 14657, IA 
Deutschland 128, Nr. 8 secr., band 1.  William’s doubts are recorded in the marginalia. 
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Zimmerman expected an alliance would be well regarded in Sofia due to the passage of 
the loan offer and that most Bulgarian newspapers were anti-Serbian.9  Questions still 
remained about how Romania would respond to a Bulgarian attack on Serbia, however.  
Bucharest informed Vienna it would move against Bulgaria if Sofia attacked Serbia, 
placing the Central Powers in an awkward position vis-à-vis its current (albeit secret) 
associate.10  Nevertheless, Romania’s warning was merely viewed as posturing to force 
an offer territory in exchange for Romanian allegiance, particularly as Bucharest had 
displayed a willingness to attack Russia with a guarantee of Bulgarian neutrality.11  
 By mid-July, Tarnowski spoke with Radoslavov about a potential alliance.  Much 
to the surprise of the Austrian minister, Radoslavov offered a military agreement before 
the subject was even broached.  Although pleased by this development and the promise 
that Radoslavov would discuss his plans with Tsar Ferdinand in short order, Radoslavov 
continued to delay scheduling a meeting with the tsar about a possible alliance with 
Vienna.  More likely than not, this was a clever ploy by Radoslavov to keep Bulgaria’s 
options open, even at such an early stage of the Serbian crisis.  The prime minister’s calm 
aloofness unnerved Tarnowski, who suggested Vienna make its intentions clear and 
secure an agreement prior to a declaration of war on Serbia.12  Michahelles sympathized 
with his Austrian counterpart and supported decisive action.  In Michahelles’ estimation, 
Radoslavov was ready to discuss the draft of an agreement, which could be finalized 
                                                 
9 Michahelles, Im kaiserlichen Dienst, p. 156. 
10 Foreign Office Memorandum, 9 July 1914, ÖUA, volume 8, number 4536. 
11 Jagow to Michahelles, 9 July 1914, AA-PA, R 1922, Fiche J, Series 14657, IA 
Deutschland 128, Nr. 8 secr., band 1. 
12 Tarnowski to Foreign Ministry, 20 July 1914, ÖUA, volume 8, number 10,421. 
   
40 
quickly.13  At this juncture, however, Berchtold and Jagow overruled their ambassadors 
and recommended no action needed to be taken.14 
 On 23 July, Vienna delivered its ultimatum to Serbia, which included a stipulation 
that Serbia must submit to a Habsburg-led inquest into the death of Francis Ferdinand.  
The Dual Monarchy was certain Belgrade would refuse this demand, providing the 
pretext for war.  While anticipating a localized conflict, the Triple Alliance continued to 
work to make Austria-Hungary’s success more certain.  Pro-Bulgarian guerrilla bands in 
Macedonia began wreaking havoc along the Serbo-Bulgarian border by blowing up 
bridges in Serbia that led east to Bulgaria and south towards Greece and Salonika.15  
Tarnowski was authorized to help facilitate these actions and, proceeding with care and 
caution, planned to provide funds and rifles to these organizations once the Dual 
Monarchy began its assault on Serbia.16  As a result of the turmoil in the borderlands, 
increasing numbers of refugees from Macedonia poured into Bulgaria, further exciting an 
already tense public.  The chaos that ensued made a violent uprising a real possibility, 
which gave the guerrillas even more license to act.17   
                                                 
13 Michahelles, Im kaiserlichen Dienst, p. 155. 
14 Jagow to Michahelles, 21 July 1914, AA-PA, R 1922, Fiche J, Series 14657, IA 
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15 These guerillas, known as komitadji, originated in Aegean Macedonia during the time 
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population to unify with Bulgaria.  Since these paramilitary groups were sowing 
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fear of starting a war.  Nevertheless, since at least the Bosnian Annexation Crisis, Vienna 
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Silberstein, Troubled Alliance, p. 28; Holden, Bulgaria’s Entrance, p. 83. 
16 Berchtold to Tarnowski, ÖUA, Volume 8, number 10,621. 
17 The Times (London), 19 September 1914. 
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Such actions did not go unnoticed by the Entente, as Sir Henry Bax-Ironside 
recognized that Austrian arms flowing into Bulgaria were “a clear indication that Austria 
and Bulgaria had reached a settlement concerning Macedonia.”18  In spite of what 
appeared to be the case, Sofia was still far away from an agreement with Vienna.  When 
the Dual Monarchy finally broke off relations with Serbia on 25 July, Berlin was certain 
the impending war would not be localized for long, making the support of states like 
Bulgaria critical.19  Accordingly, Jagow instructed Michahelles to offer an alliance to 
Sofia once again.  While personally interested in an agreement with Germany and its 
allies, Radoslavov demurred, proclaiming to Michahelles in a private meeting that 
Bulgaria would remain neutral if war broke out.20  
Even so, Radoslavov took the opportunity to inquire about the price Austria and 
Germany might pay for Bulgaria’s assistance.  In ongoing discussions, Radoslavov 
notified Tarnowski of the areas he hoped to gain from Serbia, and also asked for German 
and Austrian guarantees for an agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey in order to 
secure Bulgaria’s claims to western Thrace.21  Since Austria had not yet declared war on 
Serbia and the Central Powers had not entered into any formal agreement with Turkey, 
these discussions were still preliminary.  In the meantime, the Bulgarian cabinet agreed to 
provide tacit support and encouragement of guerrilla action on the Serbian border and 
                                                 
18 Sir Henry Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey, 26 July 1914, BDFA, part II, series H, 
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presented a copy of Michahelles’ offer to Ferdinand.22  Following Austria’s formal 
declaration of war on Serbia on 30 July, the Bulgarian government proclaimed Bulgaria’s 
neutrality and declared Sofia would keep friendly relations with Romania, even offering 
to relinquish Bulgarian claims to the southern Dobrudja should Bucharest acknowledge 
Bulgaria’s right to certain parts of Macedonia.23  While vague, this statment demonstrated 
Sofia’s good intentions to Romania and the Central Powers. 
 Following the declarations of war by Britain, France and Russia and neutrality by 
Greece, Italy, Romania and Turkey, Bulgaria reaffirmed its neutrality.  Radoslavov saw 
no reason to enter the war yet, because Bulgaria had not received any proposals for 
military action and due to warnings of reprisals from Romania and Greece.  On 2 August, 
Radoslavov drafted the terms of a military agreement with the Central Powers, seeking 
assurance on three points: 
First: the Dreibund guarantees Bulgaria’s present territory from any attack, from 
whatever side it may come.   
 
Second: the Dreibund promises its support for its [Bulgaria’s] ambitions for future 
territorial acquisitions on its borders, on which it has historic and ethnographic 
rights, and which are under the control of nations, which do not belong to the 
Dreibund. 
 
[Third:] If Romania should join with the Dreibund, it will have nothing to fear 
from Bulgaria, as in later territorial changes Bulgaria will only seek acquisitions 
in the west.  Should Romania join with Russia [however], Bulgaria would have a 
free hand to assert its claims on the Dobrudcha again, and would be permitted to 
march against Romania eventually.24 
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Satisfaction of these points would ensure Bulgaria’s protection from attack by its 
neighbors, and guarantee much of the territory Sofia desired.  The “loss” of the Dobrudja 
would sting, but if it meant ensuring Romania’s neutrality/support, Radoslavov was 
willing to accept this.  The terms were suitable both to Jagow and German Chancellor 
Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1909-1917), and so on the following day Michahelles 
began negotiations along the lines of Radoslavov’s draft agreement.25   
While hoping that these discussions might lead to a Bulgarian attack on Serbia, it 
was unclear to Michahelles whether he was bargaining for Bulgaria’s benevolent 
neutrality or involvement in the war.26  The German ambassador made only a single 
modification to Radoslavov’s proposal, adding a clause that read, “at the request of 
Germany, Bulgaria will use its army against any neighbors that were at war with it.”27 
This would allow Berlin to fix the moment of Bulgaria’s attack.  Helmuth von Moltke, 
the chief of the German General Staff, was particularly supportive of this addendum, and 
urged the war ministry to “let loose the Bulgarians against the Serbs, and let that pack 
strike each other dead.”28  This was a dangerous move considering Sofia’s weakened 
military state after the Second Balkan War, but the potential rewards were certainly worth 
the risk.  The greatest challenge now was finding a way to consummate a deal quickly. 
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Nevertheless, Bulgaria instead reaffirmed its neutrality, a decision motivated by 
the unexpected appearance of the two German warships Goeben and Breslau in the 
Turkish Straits.  While the German ships were there first and foremost out of necessity 
rather than to attack Russia, the fact the ships were so close to Bulgarian territory 
reaffirmed the possibility that the conflict might spread to Bulgaria’s doorstep.29  Further 
progress towards an agreement with the Central Powers stalled as a result of the their 
slim chances of victory, the bad financial and military state of the Bulgaria due to the two 
Balkan wars, and the existence of a strong current of friendly sentiment towards Russia.30  
Sofia’s inaction at this time was probably in its best interests.  Bulgaria had made strides 
in rebuilding itself since 1913, but it was not yet ready to make a military commitment.31  
Radoslavov was content merely to drive up the price for Bulgaria’s neutrality, sparing it 
the costs of war, but still securing promises of additional territory. 
Radoslavov was also willing to maintain neutrality since he had yet to receive a 
better, or firmer, offer from the Triple Entente.  As the European powers prepared for 
war, securing Turkish neutrality was one of Whitehall’s chief objectives.  Should Turkey 
join the Central Powers, as some in the cabinet feared, not only would it be difficult to 
supply Russia, but Turkey’s belligerency would also put increased pressure on Britain’s 
possessions in the Near and Middle East.  David Lloyd George, H. H. Asquith’s 
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chancellor of the exchequer, was particularly sensitive to these problems and advocated 
the creation of a military confederation of Balkan states on the side of the Allies.32  This, 
in Lloyd George’s opinion, would resolve the dispute between Vienna and Serbia 
quickly, as Austria-Hungary would likely prefer not to face the all the Balkan countries in 
war.33  Winston Churchill, who believed that Turkey was firmly under German influence, 
agreed.34  In his mind, an alliance similar to the one that soundly defeated the Ottoman 
forces in 1912 would consolidate the Entente’s power in the region. It would threaten the 
Central Powers’ southern flank and perhaps deter Turkey from joining the conflict.35   
While Lloyd George and Churchill advocated the creation of a new Balkan 
League, Eleftherios Venizelos, the prime minister of Greece, made a similar proposal to 
Grey.  The Greek prime minister was decidedly in favor of the Allies even in the early 
stages of the war, which frequently placed him at odds with the pro-Central Powers 
stance of the royal family.36  Nevertheless, Venizelos believed a reconstitution of the 
Balkan League would significantly benefit Athens, as it could be protected from attempts 
by Bulgaria and Turkey to seize Greek territory due to the outbreak of war.37  The plan, 
however, had its problems.  Chief among them was the need to convince four 
independent states, which had many reasons to distrust each other following the Balkan 
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Wars that working together would now be to their benefit.  Serbia, Greece and Romania 
would also have to be persuaded that it was in their interest to give up recently acquired 
territory in order to secure Sofia’s adherence to the new league.38   
The spirited advocacy of Lloyd George, Churchill, and Venizelos convinced a 
skeptical Grey that the Balkan League project was a sound way to deter Turkey from 
entering the war.39  On 13 August, Grey authorized Bax-Ironside to discuss such an 
agreement with Radoslavov.40  Bax-Ironside made his best attempts to convince Bulgaria 
to favor this policy, but, as he perceived “Bulgaria [was] following a policy of 
opportunism,” the British ambassador’s overtures had little impact. 41  Sensing the idea of 
a Balkan bloc needed help gaining traction in Sofia, the British Cabinet, at the urging of 
Churchill and Lloyd George, dispatched the Liberal MPs Noel Buxton and his brother 
Charles, widely regarded as leading experts on Bulgaria, to meet with Bulgarian leaders 
in an unofficial capacity to extol the benefits of a new league.42  While Lloyd George 
wanted this visit to be official, Grey distrusted the Buxtons’ motives and was adamant 
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that it remain unofficial.43  Churchill and Lloyd George offered their full support, 
however, and their status as members of the Asquith ministry gave greater authority to 
the Buxtons’ words as they tried to secure Bulgaria’s cooperation in the new project.44 
While the Buxtons prepared for their trip to Sofia, Bax-Ironside continued to win 
over Bulgaria on his own.  Believing that Radoslavov would be more receptive to an 
agreement that contained definitive promises, the British ambassador suggested 
contacting the other Balkan powers to determine what land they might be willing to cede.  
Bax-Ironside was certain that, in exchange for land seized from Austria-Hungary during 
the war, Nikola Pašić, the prime minister of Serbia (1912-1918), would be willing to 
surrender parts of Macedonia, while Athens would be induced to surrender the port of 
Kavalla.  He was uncertain what Romania might offer—perhaps some of the Dobrudja in 
exchange for parts of Transylvania—but felt that territory from Serbia and Greece would 
be sufficient enough to lure Bulgaria into an alliance.  In any case, much like Grey, Bax-
Ironside believed that it was up to the Balkan states themselves to reach a settlement, 
rather than have Britain dictate one.45  Unfortunately for Whitehall, however, not using 
its authority to force the Balkan states to make an agreement doomed negotiations from 
the start.  Neither Greece nor Serbia was willing to make the concessions Bax-Ironside 
had anticipated.  While Russia also put pressure on Athens, Belgrade and Bucharest, it, 
too, was unable to secure any specific promises of land that might help sway Bulgaria.46 
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As a result of these early exchanges with the Entente representatives, Radoslavov 
began to understand the types of offers he might expect for Bulgaria’s assistance.  
Consequently, he tried to push the Allies to make a firmer and better offer by stretching 
the truth and informing both Bax-Ironside and Savinsky that the Central Powers had 
extended a strong proposal.  If the Entente wished to top this offer, their best bet would 
be to grant territory up to the uncontested zone in Macedonia in exchange for benevolent 
neutrality.47  Serbia was still reluctant to offer anything without a strong commitment 
from Sofia, however.  The best the Allies could hope for was that Bulgaria would remain 
neutral, following a middle course until these territorial problems could be resolved. 
Matters between Bulgaria and the two alliance groups were at a standstill until 19 
August, when Radoslavov secured an important diplomatic victory: a Turco-Bulgarian 
defensive agreement.  Under the terms of this treaty, Turkey and Bulgaria would support 
each other in the event of war, although both parties were protected from being placed in 
an unfavorable position.  This was particularly important for Bulgaria, as it would not be 
compelled to go to war unless there existed a treaty between Bulgaria and Romania or 
between these two states and Turkey.48  This was quite a triumph for Radoslavov, as the 
agreement protected Bulgaria’s flank from a Turkish attack without sacrificing anything.   
As Turkey had become Germany’s protégé, the Central Powers hoped they could 
use this agreement to draw Bulgaria closer to them.  One day after the announcement of 
the treaty, Michahelles informed Jagow, “Radoslavov has approached me about a 
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meeting [and] I am eager to press forward with discussions.”49  Negotiations did not 
progress as smoothly as Berlin had hoped, as the Bulgarian prime minister proved to be a 
hard bargainer.  In return for Sofia’s support, Radoslavov asked for Serbian Macedonia 
and, should Greece enter the war on the opposing side, Greek Macedonia as well.50  The 
Central Powers were willing to concede Serbian land, but as matters were uncertain 
regarding Greece, nothing could be guaranteed about its territory.  Negotiations suffered 
a further blow on 24 August, when the Serbs won a stunning victory against Austria at 
the Jadar River.  Afterwards, Tarnowski found “the trust of the Bulgarian government in 
my counsel and word can scarcely have been deepened in these last days.”51   
Meanwhile, the Entente powers continued to look for a way to draw Sofia to their 
side and reconstitute the Balkan League.  Sazonov recommended making a special appeal 
to Ferdinand himself.  Rather than threaten the tsar, Sazonov suggested the Allied Powers 
should present a friendly attitude and guarantee the safety of the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 
dynasty.52  Bax-Ironside agreed, telegraphing Whitehall, “the question of peace or war is 
largely in the hands of His Majesty, who has the power to change his Austrophil Cabinet 
whenever so disposed.”53  With the support of London and Paris, on 22 August St. 
Petersburg offered Bulgaria the uncontested zone in Macedonia and guaranteed the safety 
of the crown in return for its benevolent neutrality towards Serbia and the promise to 
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attack Romania or Turkey should either state attack Russia.54  Given Bulgaria’s 
improving relations with Constantinople and Bucharest’s caution, this was a low-
risk/high-reward opportunity.  More would have to be offered to draw Sofia into the war, 
and so Russia promised Bulgaria further compensation from Serbia and Greece.55   
On 24 August, Bax-Ironside and Radoslavov resumed negotiations.  Britain’s 
ambassador reported that Radoslavov was receptive to his proposal, although the 
Bulgarian prime minister preferred an offer of guaranteed territory before moving 
forward.  Radoslavov was optimistic that Bulgaria would acquire Kavalla, but he doubted 
Serbia could be induced to surrender land.  To that end, Radoslavov hoped the Entente 
might pressure the Serbian government, now headquartered in Niš, to cede the land 
promised to Bulgaria in 1912, with the understanding that further discussions on Mostar 
could occur later.56  Théophile Delcassé, the French foreign minister, supported this plan, 
as it would grant Sofia considerable gains at a minimal cost.57  Unfortunately, neither 
Greece nor Serbia was willing to make concessions and Grey was reluctant to force these 
states to do so, believing “territorial rearrangements must be a matter of discussion 
between the Balkan States themselves; I could not interfere in this; and the part we could 
play would be to give financial assistance when a confederation has been arranged.”58  
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This not only disappointed Radoslavov, but also members of the British cabinet.  Lloyd 
George felt “a golden opportunity had been allowed to slip by” and Churchill laced into 
Grey for his “indecisiveness at a time when Britain needed to act.”59   
With discussions deadlocked for the Entente and the Central Powers, both sides 
looked for ways to push Bulgaria to sign an agreement.  Jagow contemplated a heavy-
handed approach, in hopes of forcing Bulgaria to take a definitive stance.  Accordingly, 
he demanded a new clause be added to the 22 August offer that would require military 
action from Bulgaria or else the provisional agreement would be nullified.  Moreover, he 
told Michahelles to inform Sofia that it had six days to accept the German proposal or 
negotiations would be cut off.60  The more cautious Michahelles never presented this 
ultimatum, however, as Zimmerman understood this would drive Bulgaria towards the 
Entente.  Both Vienna and Berlin instead agreed to issue a joint statement that prompt 
action would be best in order for any agreement to have a beneficial effect.61 
A similar level of frustration existed in the Entente camp, as Serbia, Greece and 
Romania refused to make concessions.  Delcassé tried to move things forward by 
proposing an offer of Thrace to the Enos-Midia line, but both Britain and Russia resisted 
this idea.62  Sazonov proposed a joint statement be issued at Niš that would pressure 
Serbia to give up territory for the greater good of a Bulgarian alliance.  Although Grey 
and Delcassé had been hesitant to force Serbia to surrender territory, both now agreed 
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this might not be a bad idea.63  While the plan seemed like it would bear fruit, Serbia 
angrily rejected this proposal.  Pašić warned them that the mere suggestion of territorial 
concessions in the skupština (parliament) would damaged Serbian morale.64  The only 
way in which Niš would relinquish territory would be if specific circumstances occurred: 
if Bulgaria aggressively opposed a joint Turkish-Romanian attack and if Serbia was 
guaranteed territory in Croatia, it might be willing to make concessions.65 
Despite Bax-Ironside’s growing doubts and the failed attempts to secure Bulgaria, 
the Buxtons, now in Sofia on their unofficial mission, refused to give up hope.  Drawing 
upon his prior experiences in Bulgaria, Noel Buxton felt “it would be wrong to convey 
the impression that Bulgaria cannot be won and Balkan unity is a chimera.”66  The 
Buxtons did all they could to convince Bulgarian politicians and the tsar that Bulgaria’s 
greatest benefit lay with the Entente, but a lack of support from London hamstrung their 
efforts.  Grey refused to make the mission official, limiting the weight and authority of 
the Buxtons’ words.  While Grey’s caution in foreign policy was partly to blame, his 
personal feelings played a role as well.  Grey resented Noel Buxton’s meddling in foreign 
affairs, going so far as to label him “an amiable nincompoop” at one point.67  Despite the 
August setbacks, the Buxtons soldiered forth, meeting with top officials at the beginning 
of the following month. 
                                                 
63 Grey, Twenty-Five Years, p. 265.  For the text of the declaration, see Curtright, 
Muddle, pp. 32-33. 
64 Holden, Bulgaria’s Entrance, p. 101. 
65 Strandtmann to Sazonov, 27 August 1914, IB, series II, volume 6, p. 171. 
66 Noel Buxton and Charles Rhoden Buxton, The War and the Balkans (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1915), p. 76. 
67 Robbins, “British Diplomacy,” p. 567. 
   
53 
The month of September saw little change in the diplomatic scene in Sofia.  
Radoslavov refused to commit to one side or the other, offering little more than vague 
assurances of support should the proper opportunity arise.  On the one hand, the lack of a 
decisive military victory on either the Western or Eastern Front made Bulgaria straddle 
the fence.  On the other hand, Radoslavov found it to his advantage to remain neutral, as 
his majority in the Bulgarian parliament was razor-thin, and, according to public opinion 
polls, Bulgarians still favored neutrality and/or joining with the Entente.68 
In the meantime, the Allied Powers still tried to convince Niš to make some 
sacrifices to win over Bulgaria.  Sazonov did not take Pašić’s refusals too seriously, as 
the Russian foreign minister recognized Serbia’s only real hope of gaining the territory it 
desired rested with a Bulgarian agreement.  Consequently, Sazonov proposed the Entente 
powers issue a proclamation in St. Petersburg that “compensation would be given to her 
[Bulgaria] if others made substantial gains elsewhere, or will be given at the expense of 
anyone who has fought against us.”69  Although the Entente states gave their support, 
Greece and Serbia were unwilling to back a proposal that promised territory that would 
not come from a defeated state.  Russia, fearing the imminent loss of Turkey as a 
potential ally, put considerable pressure on Athens to buy Sofia’s friendship with land.  
Venizelos, however, chafed under this heavy-handedness, threatening to resign and leave 
the government in the hands of pro-German factions.70  Terrified by such a prospect, 
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Grey withdrew his support for a joint statement.71  Instead, the Entente issued a weaker 
declaration at Niš reaffirming its position that Serbia must make territorial concessions.72 
On 11 September, the same day the Allies made their statement at Niš, the 
Buxtons met with Radoslavov for the first time.  Their meeting went well, as the prime 
minister assured the brothers Bulgaria would remain neutral, leaving open the possibility 
of a military convention with the Entente.73  Over the next few days, the Buxtons met 
with members of several Bulgarian political parties, emerging from these meetings with a 
sense that while most Bulgarians feared a Turkish attack should Bulgaria join the Allies, 
the promise of a British loan and endorsement of territorial gains elsewhere might justify 
a change in policy.74  While they found Radoslavov’s words encouraging, Bax-Ironside 
and Grey grew increasingly frustrated that the Buxton brothers’ presence in the Balkans, 
so carefully presented as an unofficial diplomatic mission, was characterized increasingly 
as an official British representation.75  In Bulgarian press reportage, Britain came off as 
more pro-Bulgarian than Grey preferred, thus doing potential harm to Whitehall’s 
delicate relationships with Romania and Greece.76  In a further attempt to secure 
Bulgaria, the Buxtons made excursions to Bulgaria’s northern and southern neighbors, 
meeting with their respective royal families.  If nothing else, they earned goodwill for 
Britain, returning to Sofia with noncommittal words of encouragement that some kind of 
arrangement with Bulgaria might be reached. 
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While London dealt with the Buxtons, the Russians created further problems.  On 
20 September, without the sanction of Grey or Delcassé, Sazonov reached an agreement 
with Bucharest promising Transylvania and southern Bukovina in return for Romania’s 
benevolent neutrality.77  Though the pact had little effect in the end, Grey was incensed 
by this act of Russian unilateralism.  A crisis was averted when, in a cabinet meeting on 
23 September, Churchill and Charles Masterman, the head of the War Propaganda 
Bureau, convinced Grey to accept that war with Turkey was inevitable and to use the 
progress Russia had made with Romania to the Entente’s advantage vis-à-vis Bulgaria.   
Despite the continued pressure from Churchill and Masterman, as well as the 
positive efforts of the Buxtons, Grey was still unwilling to make a definite promise to 
Bulgaria or put additional demands on its neighbors.  Instead, he asked Bax-Ironside to 
issue another vague statement to Radoslavov: 
You can tell Prime Minister that, though we cannot make promises about 
territorial arrangements in the Balkans, which depend upon contingencies not yet 
realized and primarily concern the Balkan states themselves, we should not be 
unsympathetic to Bulgarian claims if large additions of territory were acquired by 
other States as a result of the war.78 
 
While Radoslavov reacted favorably, he still wanted a concrete offer before adopting a 
policy that might result in Bulgaria going to war.  As October wore on, various members 
of parliament exhorted Grey to secure Bulgaria’s friendship with the territory of others, 
particularly Serbia, which remained uncooperative and intransigent.79  On 12 October, the 
British ambassador to Turkey, Sir Louis Mallet, reported a suggestion that his Russian 
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counterpart had passed on to Sazonov: that the Entente should compel Serbia to cede 
Macedonia up to the Vardar River as a sign of good faith.80  The ever-cautious Grey took 
this suggestion “under consideration,” but did not act on it.81 
 Meanwhile, Noel and Charles Buxton continued their unofficial work.  Through 
discussions with influential Bulgarian politicians, they were able to craft a proposal that 
would guarantee Sofia’s neutrality as well as Romania’s participation in the war.  In a 
memorandum sent to the Foreign Office on 21 October, they advocated a joint 
declaration by the Entente powers promising support for Bulgaria’s claim to the part of 
Macedonia agreed upon in the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance of 1912 in return for its 
benevolent neutrality towards Romania and Serbia and entry into the war on the side of 
the Entente should Turkey join the hostilities.  In order to assuage Serbia, the Allies 
would recognize its rights to Bosnia and ports on the Dalmatian coast, should Bulgaria 
receive the portion of Macedonia in question.82  Within a week, each of the Allied 
representatives in Bulgaria voiced his support for the proposal, also agreeing that if 
Serbia remained recalcitrant, it would not be unreasonable to pressure Niš to accept these 
terms.83  Despite the growing consensus that action needed to be taken, Grey 
characteristically demurred, as he believed that compelling Serbia to make territorial 
concessions was out of the question.84  This did not deter Savinsky, however, who 
demanded Serbia make some concessions during a meeting with Pašić on 29 October.  
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The Serbian prime minister promised Savinsky that his government would consider 
surrendering Macedonian territory, but only as far as the Vardar.85 
 Thus matters stood when, on 29 October, the status quo in the Balkans was 
suddenly disrupted.  On that day, the German warships Goeben and Breslau, which by 
now had been transferred to the Turkish navy, while retaining their German crews, fired 
upon Russian military installations on the Black Sea coast.86  As a result, the Entente 
immediately declared war on the Ottoman Empire.  The abrupt turn of events now 
presented Entente diplomats with the possibility of trying to win over Bulgaria with a 
slice of (western) Turkey.  British representatives in Athens and Constantinople 
suggested to their Bulgarian counterparts that Bulgaria could gain Thrace and Adrianople 
in return for its support.87  Radoslavov seemed receptive to this proposal and indicated to 
the allied representatives that an understanding with the Entente might be possible.88   
On 1 November, Bax-Ironside, buoyed by the recent developments in the Near 
East, reported to Grey, “if Bulgaria can be prevented from attacking Serbia for three 
weeks or so, she will eventually come in against Turkey.”89  On 18 November, Bax-
Ironside presented a new proposal, which promised specific gains in Macedonia (territory 
up to the Vardar), Thrace to the Enos-Midia line, and considerable financial support for a 
Bulgarian attack on Turkey.  Nevertheless, Radoslavov rejected this offer.90  Incensed by 
this behavior, Romania, Serbia and Greece promptly began to renege on their territorial 
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promises.91  Furthermore, while Grey and Sazonov had been willing to pressure Serbia to 
surrender territory to Bulgaria, their growing frustration with Sofia caused them to 
rethink taking a hard line with Niš.  As a result, the best the Allies could do was issue a 
joint statement on 24 November that made vague promises of territorial compensation 
after the war if Bulgaria remained neutral towards Serbia and Romania.  Accordingly, if 
Bulgaria were to take military action against Austria-Hungary or Turkey, then Sofia 
could expect greater rewards.92  Without specific guarantees, however, Radoslavov 
refused to budge, reaffirming Bulgaria’s strict neutrality instead. 
 In the face of the Entente’s progress, the Central Powers did not stand idly by.  
While Bulgarian neutrality still benefited Germany and its Habsburg ally, Radoslavov’s 
negotiations with the Entente did not sit well with Berchtold or Jagow, who were afraid 
these talks might result in an agreement guaranteeing Sofia’s neutrality in the event 
Romania attacked Austria.93  As Austrian sources were reporting that the Entente was 
making more concrete proposals, Berchtold decided Vienna and Berlin needed to up the 
ante.  In addition to promising Bulgaria Enos-Midia Thrace, the Ballhausplatz guaranteed 
all of Macedonia up to and including Niš.  This came with a promise of Romanian 
support if Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece.94  After a mid-November meeting with 
Count István Tisza, the Hungarian prime minister, Jagow concluded that the best course 
of action would be a quick and decisive Bulgarian attack on Serbia.  Consequently, he 
pushed for stronger efforts in Sofia.  In his own words, Michahelles found himself “stuck 
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in a difficult position…although I too distrusted Bulgaria’s motives, there was little that 
could be done to sway Sofia.”95  Michahelles did his best to reassure Jagow he was 
making every effort possible to secure Bulgaria.96 
 Despite Tarnowski’s and Michahelles’ efforts, Berchtold was not certain that the 
Central Powers were offering Sofia sufficient territorial inducements. 97  Wanting to make 
an offer that would clearly trump the Entente’s, he instructed Tarnowski to promise 
Bulgaria, in exchange for its neutrality, “a frontier expansion which the Entente powers 
can never assign her: all of Serbian Macedonia, the Pirot and Niš regions, and support for 
Bulgarian ambitions for Kavalla and Salonika.”98  While Turkey also wished to reclaim 
Salonika, Vienna and Berlin were confident a suitable compromise could be worked out 
later.  Although Berchtold wanted a quick resolution, he understood only so much 
pressure could be put on Sofia:  
We must not place the Radoslavov ministry in a difficult position and we must not 
drive Bulgaria into the arms of the Entente, but by promising Turkish help and 
presenting the advantages which Bulgaria could expect from active participation 
on our side we may bring the Bulgarian government in our direction.99   
 
By the end of November 1914, the Central Powers were in the same position as 
the Entente: both sides sought Bulgaria’s neutrality, but neither had been able to come up 
with the right combination of territorial (or financial) inducements in exchange.  The only 
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firm offers stemmed from situations in which Bulgaria would become militarily involved 
– but Bulgaria steadfastly avoided this.  Berlin and Vienna had failed to convince Sofia to 
join a Balkan campaign; St. Petersburg could not persuade Bulgaria to make a decision at 
all; and London was unable to induce Serbia, Romania, and Greece to make the 
concessions necessary to reconstitute the Balkan League.  Britain’s failure to force Serbia 
to cede territory looms as a major factor.  The negotiations in November 1914 proved 
Bulgaria was unwilling to go to war for the sake of Enos-Midia.  If Sofia could have 
secured that territory along with parts of Macedonia, however, matters might have been 
different.  France and Russia supported compelling Serbia to make concessions, and 
British solidarity might have provided Pašić with the justification to do so, even if the 
Serbian populace would have been unhappy.  This lack of strong coalition diplomacy 
made it hard for Radoslavov to understand exactly what the Entente was promising, 
making an agreement very difficult.   
As 1914 came to an end, Bulgaria was in a relatively favorable position.  It could 
observe the progress of the war “from afar,” in an attempt to determine which side was 
likely to emerge victorious.  Moreover, it could afford to wait until its suitors provided 
the right combination of incentives in exchange for either Bulgarian neutrality or support.  
The Central Powers and the Entente knew they needed to do more to secure, in the words 
of Noel and Charles Buxton, the services of the “Judas Iscariot” of the Balkans.100
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Chapter III  
Driving a Hard Bargain: Specific Offers Made and Bulgaria’s Final Acceptance 
 
With Turkey’s entry into the war, Bulgaria became an increasingly important 
player in the affairs of both the Triple Entente and the Central Powers.  At the very least, 
both alliance groups sought Bulgaria’s benevolent neutrality.  If either side could sway 
Sofia to enter the conflict, however, the tides of the war might shift drastically.  By 
joining the Allies, Bulgaria could provide needed support to Serbia, shore up Russia’s 
defenses, and effectively neutralize Turkey.  Siding with the Central Powers, however, 
would cut Russia off from its allies and deliver the finishing blow to Serbia.  Sofia 
recognized its unique position and pushed both sides to make specific and sizeable offers.  
From the outset of hostilities, Radoslavov had pursued a policy of wait and bargain, and 
was astute in doing so.  In August, he had received an offer of a military convention with 
Austria-Hungary that would have promised unspecified territorial gains.  By December, 
he was entertaining proposals with similar concessions for nothing more than benevolent 
neutrality.  Nationalists still dreamed of restoring San Stefano Bulgaria and, if Sofia 
continued to manage its position well, it seemed achieving this goal was possible. 
Following Radoslavov’s rejection of the Entente’s vague statement of 24 
November, Sazonov and Grey realized the woeful inadequacy of their offer and worked 
to strengthen it.  On 2 December, Sazonov proposed the Allies make a series of 
declarations to the Balkan states that might win their individual support for a concrete 
offer to Bulgaria.  They would promise Greece southern Albania and protection from a 
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Bulgarian attack if it would assist Serbia.  In return for surrendering parts of Macedonia, 
Britain, France and Russia would guarantee Pašić access to the Adriatic Sea as well as 
Bosnia and a common border with Greece, while Romania would have to assure Greece’s 
safety.  Once each of these states agreed to these proposals, a new statement would be 
issued in Sofia in which the Allies would make their guarantees and offer specific 
territory for Bulgarian neutrality: Thrace to the Enos-Midia line and Macedonia up to the 
Vardar River, including Ishtip and Kotschana.  Should Sofia enter the war, it would gain 
the entire uncontested zone in Macedonia.1  In full agreement, the Entente approached 
Greece on 5 December and Romania the next day.  Neither Athens nor Bucharest was 
particularly enthusiastic, however, and rejected these propositions on the grounds that 
they did not sufficiently guarantee Bulgaria’s neutrality.   
Even without the support of Greece and Romania, the Entente powers presented 
their proposal to Bulgaria on 9 December.  While their offer provided more specific gains 
than the 24 November plan, the Allies still sought a full military alliance.  Consequently, 
Radoslavov rejected it, reporting to Panifieu and Bax-Ironside Bulgaria needed a more 
substantial offer for its participation in the war.2  Sofia’s ideal aims were now becoming 
clear: avoiding war if it all possible and, in doing so, acquiring the portion of Macedonia 
promised it in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912, the Vardar River valley, the port of 
Kavalla, Thrace and Adrianople, and the Dobrudja.3  If the Entente wanted Bulgaria as an 
ally, it would have to make all of these concessions plus offer enough financial support to 
                                                 
1 Savinsky, Recollections, p. 274. 
2 Bax-Ironside to Grey, 9 December 1914, BDFA, part II, series H, volume 1, p. 152. 
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wipe away its debts to Austria and Germany as part of their recent loan agreement.  At 
the very least, Radoslavov told the Allied ministers, “the Bulgarian price for entry into 
the war was the immediate possession of Macedonia.”4  The first hurdle, then, was 
convincing Serbia to cede parts of Macedonia.  To that end, Sazonov suggested  
promis[ing] Servia important accessions of territory giving [it] free access to 
Adriatic in return for…[eastern Macedonia] as far as the Vardar if Bulgaria 
maintains neutrality, and for part of Macedonia provided for in 1912 treaty if 
Bulgaria actively participated at the moment desired by the Powers.5 
 
This plan never made it past preliminary discussions, however, as Grey was unwilling to 
make any demands on Niš due to the immense blow Serbian national prestige suffered as 
a result of the loss of Belgrade, a major setback in the Austro-Hungarian campaign.6 
 By the end of 1914, the Allies had taken no decisive action.  The Entente powers 
reasoned that once it was clear whether Serbia could break its stalemate with Austria, 
they could more easily define what territory Niš would acquire.  With that settled, they 
could then decide what land Serbia would surrender and force it to agree.  Bulgaria’s 
neighbors still favored a new league, but progress towards that goal remained at a 
standstill since none were willing to offer the territory necessary to secure Sofia.  
Consequently, the Allies put a temporary hold on their Balkan projects, hoping the next 
few weeks would provide a more favorable position from which to bargain.   
 At the same time, the Central Powers were also encountering troubles with 
respect to territorial guarantees.  Some of the territory Bulgaria sought was negotiable 
depending on what Greece and Romania did, but the amount of land needed to secure 
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Bulgarian military support was considerable.  Further complicating matters was that on 7 
December Radoslavov asked Tarnowski to provide a written guarantee of Macedonia in 
order to justify his rejection of the Entente’s offers.7  The Habsburg ambassador was 
willing to honor this request, as long as the Bulgarian prime minister made it clear who 
would actually see this written pledge.  The Ballhausplatz, however, refused.  While 
willing to offer Bulgaria any land its forces occupied, Berchtold believed Sofia should 
not be promised anything for doing nothing.8  The Habsburg foreign minister consulted 
Jagow on this matter and the two agreed that a written statement was unwise.  While 
sensitive to Radoslavov’s difficult position, Jagow felt a joint oral declaration by Vienna 
and Berlin would be more appropriate.  Bulgaria could only secure a written guarantee by 
agreeing to support the Central Powers.9 
 Although Radoslavov understood Jagow’s position, he countered by asking for 
something in writing, even if it was just a secret note he alone would see.  With this in 
hand, the prime minister could inform the parliament that he had a formal assurance of 
territory from Germany and Austria-Hungary that could justify rejecting the Entente.10  
Despite his reservations about a formal offer, Berchtold gave his consent, but Jagow 
remained concerned Radoslavov would not exercise proper discretion.11  The German 
foreign minister was also hesitant due to a report he received from one of his attachés, 
General Wilhelm von der Goltz (also known as von der Goltz Pasha) who reported that, 
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while Ferdinand and his prime minister supported the Central Powers, a large majority of 
the Bulgarian populace opposed the war.   Flouting public opinion could lead to the 
government’s collapse, and so, for the time being, Bulgaria had to remain neutral.12  
Michahelles agreed with Jagow’s caution adding that “for some months, Herr 
Radoslavoff had a draft of alliance that provided more land than the Entente would 
grant.”13  Ultimately, however, Berlin followed Vienna’s lead and agreed to a written 
offer of territory for both Bulgarian neutrality and military support.   
Several weeks passed before the final wording of a pledge was satisfactory, since 
Jagow wanted to ensure Bulgaria was not promised too much for neutrality.14  Finally, on 
4 January Tarnowski presented the secret note to Radoslavov; Michahelles followed two 
days later: “Austria [Germany] guarantees to Bulgaria that it will obtain after the war all 
the territories of the Kingdom of Serbia to which Bulgaria possesses historic and 
ethnographic rights and which it will occupy with its own troops.”15  Although the 
guarantees were vague, Radoslavov had achieved a major diplomatic victory.  Bulgaria 
had made no formal commitment to the Central Powers, and yet it now had secured a 
broad promise of Serbian territory for virtual inaction.   
At this point, Bulgaria had now received a vaguely worded guarantee of 
Macedonia from the Central Powers as well as a written promise of a smaller portion of 
territory in exchange for neutrality from the Entente.  In both cases, the gains would be 
substantial and come at little risk.  This was the most that either the Central Powers or the 
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Entente could claim as a success at the beginning of 1915.  As Sir William Robertson, 
then the Chief of Staff of the British Expeditionary Force, wrote, “since the war began, 
diplomacy had seriously failed to assist us with regard to Bulgaria.”16  The same could be 
said of Germany and Austria, which had expended considerable energy to secure 
Bulgaria, but had little to show for it.  Since January was not an opportune time to launch 
a campaign, Sofia was able to wait and see if could secure even more Macedonian 
territory as well as a stronger assurance that any guarantees would be fulfilled.17  
While matters were a mess in Southeastern Europe, the Entente hoped it could 
find a way, in the words of British cabinet secretary Maurice Hankey, to “guarantee to 
each nation concerned that fair play should be rendered and…there ought to be no 
insuperable obstacle to the occupation of the Dardanelles, Constantinople, and 
Bosphorus.”18  Accordingly, Russia planned a naval maneuver in the Black Sea, and 
Britain considered an expedition that might draw Bulgaria and Greece into the war.  
Churchill, Sir John Fisher (the first sea lord), and Lloyd George were enthusiastic about a 
naval venture in the Dardanelles, while the Buxtons, who by this time had returned from 
Bulgaria, again pushed for a Balkan confederation aligned against Turkey and Austria.19  
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The Buxtons also advocated for a declaration that delineated what Sofia would gain in 
exchange for an alliance with a full guarantee the Allies would deliver on their pledge.20   
At this time, Britain also devised plans for a relief expedition that would land at 
Salonika, hopefully inducing Greece to enter the war.  Lloyd George strongly supported 
this venture, as he believed “there was no more time to be wasted dilly-dallying if the 
Balkans were to be saved.”21  Once he and Churchill had secured French support for this 
action, Lord Kitchener, the secretary of state for war, agreed to send a division of British 
troops; Russian forces would arrive soon thereafter.22  Nevertheless, Greek support for 
this project did not materialize as expected.  Although London promised considerable 
territorial gains and protection from a counter-attack, Venizelos feared a joint assault 
from Turkey and Bulgaria.  Without the guarantee of Romanian support, he refused to 
back this action.23  Consequently, the Salonika campaign had to be delayed. 
Meanwhile, the Allies continued to look for diplomatic ways to break the Balkan 
logjam.  In the middle of January Sazonov proposed a new declaration be made to Serbia 
promising specific territorial gains in exchange for the land that was to be surrendered to 
Sofia.  In return for the sections of Macedonia promised in the treaty of 1912, Serbia 
would gain Bosnia and Hercegovina, southern Albania and a portion of southern 
Dalmatia.24  Nevertheless, Savinsky still doubted whether this would be enough land to 
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sway Bulgaria to action or that Serbia would even cede this territory.25  While taking 
Sazonov’s suggestions under advisement, the Allied representatives in Serbia haggled for 
several days about what Niš should be asked to surrender.  Finally, on 29 January, they 
recommended Serbia should cede Macedonia to the Vardar in an offer for Bulgarian 
neutrality and Macedonia up to the 1912 treaty line for its active participation in the war.  
Recognizing this still might not be enough for Sofia, the ambassadors suggested the 
Entente should also mention Kavalla and Enos-Midia.26  Finally, they advised that “the 
three Powers should press the Serbian Government to make necessary concessions, and, 
if it refuses, they should intimate they will take matters into their own hands and make 
requisite offers to Bulgaria without further consultation with Serbia.”27 
Before presenting Pašić with anything official, Grey suggested consulting him to 
ensure a favorable response.  Pašić was not at all pleased by this proposal, threatening to 
resign if the Entente continued formulating offers clearly favoring Sofia.28  With Serbia 
still unwilling to budge, the Allies were unable to break the impasse in the Balkans.   
Nevertheless, the Entente once again considered dispatching a special diplomatic 
mission to Sofia to make an offer of alliance, in which Bulgaria would gain Macedonia to 
the Vardar, Monastir, and the Enos-Midia line in return for war against Turkey.  Both 
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Delcassé and Grey agreed the military situation at the beginning of February was not 
favorable, and that it would be more prudent to delay a mission until the Entente’s 
position was stronger, as the prospect of victory would be a greater inducement than any 
land that could be offered.29  Consequently, St. Petersburg, London and Paris agreed they 
would dispatch a delegation when a good opportunity arose. 
The first chance to act came on 19 February, when the Allies launched the 
Dardanelles Campaign.  Its early successes, coupled with Russian victories in Galicia, 
had a clear effect, as Radoslavov recognized the attack on the Dardanelles raised Sofia’s 
value: “the moment has come to alter the character of the strict neutrality which Bulgaria 
has maintained up to now.”30  Such pronouncements gave Britain, France and Russia 
hope that a Bulgarian attachment to the Entente was imminent.   
What Radoslavov had in mind, however, was quite different from what the 
Entente anticipated. The prime minister would only change the nature of Bulgaria’s 
neutrality if he could secure more territory in the process.  In their latest proposal, the 
Allies had offered Enos-Midia, Macedonia as promised in 1912, the southern Dobrudja, 
Kavalla, and monetary aid and guarantees against Greek and Romanian attacks in return 
for an assault on Turkey.  Radoslavov was willing to agree to this, but only for Bulgarian 
neutrality.31  At this time, he calculated Sofia’s value had reached a point where it could 
gain everything Bulgaria desired without firing a single shot.32  While the Entente 
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rejected Radoslavov’s counter-proposal, they took it under consideration, as it was 
growing desperate to gain Sofia. 
Although Radoslavov was flirting with the Entente at this time, the Central 
Powers did not ease up in their pursuit.  Germany and Austria-Hungary now tried to use 
the 1914 loan as leverage for Sofia’s entry into the war.  As one of Radoslavov’s reasons 
for not mobilizing was that Bulgaria still lacked the infrastructure and financial resources 
to go to war, Berlin offered to pay the first installment of the loan in exchange for 
mobilization.33  Bulgarian finance minister Dimitir Tonchev strongly opposed this 
suggestion, and threatened to cancel the loan if Germany persisted, frightening Vienna 
and Berlin greatly.  By the time the loan was settled on 31 January, the Central Powers 
had offered 150 million francs with very favorable terms and no military strings 
attached.34  Even with this agreement, however, the Central Powers doubted they could 
still count on Bulgaria ever fighting on their side. 
At the end of February and the beginning of March, the Bulgarian ambassador in 
Vienna approached Graf Stephen Burián von Rajecz (who had replaced Berchtold as the 
Habsburg Foreign Minister in mid-January) and the German ambassador at Vienna, 
Heinrich von Tschirschky, about a new guarantee for Bulgaria.35  The Bulgarian 
ambassador told them that the Allies had recently offered the Enos-Midia line for 
Bulgaria’s neutrality and Sofia wanted to know if the Central Powers would make a 
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similar offer of territory from Serbia as a counter-proposal.36  While sensitive to the fact 
that the Central Powers could not afford to lose ground, neither Burián nor Tschirschky 
was willing to counter the Entente’s proposal, claiming that the loan agreement finalized 
the month before was proof of Vienna’s and Berlin’s strong commitment to Bulgaria.37 
Two weeks after Burián and Tschirschky made this declaration, Berlin began to 
step up its efforts in Bulgaria.  Turkey was in need of relief, and so the chief of the 
German General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, agreed to a joint Austro-German campaign 
in northern Serbia, in which Bulgarian assistance would be crucial.38  On 16 March, 
Michahelles approached Radoslavov about Sofia’s support for this action, but found the 
prime minister had little interest since the attack would take place in a limited portion of 
Serbia.39  In order to convince Sofia to join the Central Powers, Falkenhayn modified the 
plan to a more general assault.  Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, the chief of staff of the 
Austrian army, agreed to this, but refused to dispatch any troops unless Bulgaria was 
willing to mobilize.  Falkenhayn believed it would be easy to secure Sofia’s support since 
the bulk of the forces would come from Germany and Austria, but, as Jagow reminded 
him, Bulgaria would not sign a military agreement without an offer of territory, which 
would not only include Macedonia, but also parts of Serbia up to the Morava River.40 
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While Conrad supported Falkenhayn’s proposal, Austria-Hungary grew reluctant 
to undertake this campaign.  Since it was becoming increasingly likely Italy would join 
the Allies, Burián was hesitant to begin a new military maneuver without first securing 
Austria’s western flank.  Once Italy was neutralized, Vienna would be free to attack 
Serbia.  As a result, the Habsburg foreign minister advised against a proposal made by 
Michahelles to tie Bulgarian mobilization to payment of the loan.41  Jagow agreed, and so 
the disbursement was made without any military provisions, forcing Austria and 
Germany to give up their financial trump card, and scrap their campaign in Serbia. 
This diplomatic setback coincided with the defeat of the Habsburg army at 
Przemyśl, further hindering the Central Powers’ efforts in the east.  This loss landed a 
double blow, as the victory also brought the Entente diplomatic success.42  Support for 
the Allies increased in Bulgaria and, while Radoslavov still sympathized with the Central 
Powers, it was growing more difficult to back them.  The Entente hoped this upswing of 
support might force Radoslavov out of office and lead to the formation of a more pro-
Allies government.  The Dardanelles Campaign was also enjoying some success, and 
Paget believed the adherence of Bulgaria to the Allies was imminent.43 
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Meanwhile, the growing need to relieve a beleaguered Turkey compelled the 
Central Powers to find some way to overcome their recent setbacks.  As Vienna was 
focused on securing Italy, the Reich took an increasingly important role in negotiations, 
particularly because it felt the greatest need for Bulgarian aid.  Falkenhayn wanted Sofia 
to join the conflict so that he could begin his campaign against Serbia.  If this military 
action succeeded, Bulgaria would have even greater confidence in the Central Powers.44  
In early April, Colonel Erich von Leipzig, a member of Falkenhayn’s staff, made a 
personal visit to the Ferdinand in an attempt to win his support.  Leipzig made it clear 
that Bulgaria could expect significant gains for its active participation, but found the tsar 
was willing to go to war only when the Germans and Austrians began their offensive.45   
Despite Ferdinand’s reluctance, Bulgaria did not close the door on cooperating 
with the Central Powers.  Berlin continued loan payments and even promised aid to 
various politicians in the Bulgarian government.  To Andrei Tochkov, the leader of the 
Macedonian Committee, Jagow made an unofficial offer of 1912 Macedonia all the way 
to Lake Ohrid for neutrality and stated that more would be forthcoming if Sofia would 
commit to a military campaign.46  Burián, however, was more cautious than his German 
counterpart, refusing to make further concessions, particularly in regards to portions of 
Serbia that Vienna had its eyes on.  This pattern continued throughout April and May, 
                                                 
44 Michahelles, Im kaiserlichen Dienst, p. 162. 
45 Silberstein, Troubled Alliance, p. 157.  In addition to serving as a member of the 
German Gernal Staff, Erich von Leipzig had previously served as the German military 
attaché in Constantinople from 1901 to 1907.  In 1915, Leipzig returned to this post. 
46 Jagow to Bethmann-Hollweg, 6 May 1915, AA-PA, R 1929, Fiche J, Series 14674, IA 
Deutschland 128 Nr. 8 secr., band 8.  The Macedonian Committee was a minor party in 
the Bulgarian parliament, and was a part of the coalition that brought Radoslavov and his 
Liberal Party into power in 1913. 
   
74 
with Germany taking the initiative in making territorial proposals, and Austria applying a 
judicious brake wherever it could.47  With Italy’s decision on 4 May to renounce the 
Triple Alliance, Jagow became convinced that it was extremely important to secure 
Bulgarian neutrality or face a crushing blow in southeastern Europe.48 
Recognizing Germany was growing increasingly desperate, and bolstered by the 
offers the Allies were now tendering, Radoslavov now took the initiative.  On 9 May, he 
presented Michahelles with the draft of a declaration in which Germany would guarantee 
the contested and uncontested zones of Macedonia in exchange for Bulgarian neutrality.  
If war with Greece and Romania resulted, then Bulgaria could expect further gains from 
those states.49  Both Jagow and Michahelles were willing to go ahead with this proposal, 
but Burián was less enthusiastic, and Berlin faced a difficult battle in trying to secure the 
Habsburg minister’s support.50  It took days of intense discussions and heated exchanges, 
but, in the end, Burián came around.  This was due in large part to Jagow’s agreement 
that the pledge would promise only those areas under joint occupation at the end of the 
war.  The guarantee would also make it clear that Sofia would receive land from Greece 
and Romania only if these states declared war against the Central Powers.51  Burián still 
                                                 
47 Silberstein, Troubled Alliance, pp. 156-157. 
48 Jagow to Burián, 5 May 1915, AA-PA, R 1929, Fiche J, Series 14674 R 1922, IA 
Deutschland 128 Nr. 8 secr., band 8. 
49 Michahelles to Jagow, 9 May 1915, AA-PA, R 1929, Fiche J, Series 14674, IA 
Deutschland 128 Nr. 8 secr., band 8 
50 Michahelles, Im kaiserlichen Dienst, pp. 161-162. 
51 Jagow to Tshircschky, 14 May 1915, AA-PA, R 22401 Bulgariens Haltung, band 2. 
   
75 
had his doubts, but the mounting crisis with Italy forced his hand, and he authorized 
Tarnowski to make a joint declaration with Michahelles.52 
The two ambassadors worked quickly to prepare a counter to Radoslavov’s text.  
When they finally presented their revisions on 21 May, it had only one significant 
change: no mention of the contested zone was present.  If necessary, they could discuss 
this territory, but only if Radoslavov pressed for it.53  Unfortunately, the German military 
aide to the Turkish government, Colmar von der Goltz, compromised the ambassadors’ 
position.  In a visit to Sofia at this time, he had let slip that Berlin was willing to include 
the contested zone in its declaration, giving Sofia room to negotiate.54  
On 22 May, Ferdinand issued his reply to the Central Powers: citing his anxiety 
about Italy’s recent entry on the side of the Allies as well as Bulgaria’s military 
unpreparedness, his country would not yet go to war.55  In reality, the tsar understood he 
could extract a higher price from the Central Powers, particularly with a new offer 
pending from the Entente.  The Wilhelmstrasse and the Ballhausplatz were back to 
finding a new way to secure Sofia, and, in the meantime, had to hope that Turkey could 
continue to stave off the Allied attack in the Dardanelles. 
The initial, though ultimately fleeting, successes of the naval actions in the 
Dardanelles in February and early March showed Sofia that the Allies could be 
successful in the Balkans, which did more to sway Bulgarian leaders than anything else.  
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Further aiding the Entente was its progress in negotiating a military agreement with Italy.  
Once Rome’s territorial gains were outlined, the Allies could use that as a framework for 
compensation for Serbia and Bulgaria.  As Britain and France were willing to cede 
Dalmatia and Bosnia to Serbia, the possibilities of offering Sofia land in accordance with 
its wishes seemed a likelier reality than ever before.56   
As the Entente was making headway with Rome, Grey and Delcassé suggested 
the Allies should present an offer of alliance to Bulgaria once Italy declared war.57  This 
would bolster their position in the Balkans and underscore the likelihood of an Allied 
victory in the east.  In the meantime, the Allied powers worked to formulate an offer the 
Bulgarians could not refuse.  Although the Entente representatives were in agreement 
about how much land they should offer, they engaged in considerable debate about the 
price Sofia should pay for it.  Ultimately, they decided to offer the Macedonian frontier 
of 1912 and the Enos-Midia line in exchange for Bulgaria entering the war.58 
By the end of April, the Allied proposal was complete.  The final draft of the 
treaty provided Sofia with gains in Macedonia up to and including the line of 1912, 
which it would acquire at the end of the war, and Enos-Midia, which would pass into 
Bulgarian hands as soon as it occupied the territory.  Grey also pushed for the inclusion 
of Kavalla, but opposition by the French government ultimately prohibited it.59  While 
affairs in the Balkans were progressing well, Sazonov again suggested that the opportune 
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time to make this offer would be after Italy entered the war, since the Allies would be in 
the best position possible, and Bulgaria would be hard pressed to refuse them.60 
Realizing an offer from the Allies was forthcoming and responding to pressure 
from his opposition, Radoslavov went on the offensive.  On 8 May, he approached Bax-
Ironside with his own offer of a military alliance.  For the prime minster, the terms were 
simple: “Bulgaria cannot be denied its historical and ethnographic rights.  It cannot exist 
without Macedonia, for which it has shed so much blood.  Bulgaria wants all of 
Macedonia, Kavala, Seres, Drama, Dobrudzha and also Enos-Midia.”61  In effect, he was 
asking for all of San Stefano Bulgaria.  The prime minister’s proposal was met with favor 
for the most part.  Grey and Sazonov were amenable to including Kavalla, Seres, and 
Drama.  While the contested zone of Macedonia was still a sticky issue, neither was 
completely against the idea either.62 
This proposal certainly seemed to be the breakthrough the Allies had long desired, 
since they could now claim they had an offer from Bulgaria with which both sides could 
work.  The Quai d’Orsay still objected to the revisions Grey and Sazonov had agreed to 
with Radoslavov, which delayed a formal offer for a few weeks.  Delcassé found the 
offer of the Dobrudja problematic, preferring that Bulgaria and Romania resolve this 
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separately. He further questioned the wisdom of an Allied guarantee of Kavalla, 
considering Venizelos’s earlier objections.  Consequently, the Allies agreed Sofia would 
have to attack Turkey directly in order to gain Kavalla.  Should it refuse, then Greece 
could retain the city; if Bulgaria did as it was asked, and Athens refused to relinquish the 
city, then Greece would void its claims to land elsewhere.63  These modifications were 
enough to satisfy Delcassé, and the final text received full Allied support on 28 May. 
Following the Italian declaration of war on 23 May and French approval of the 
final draft, the four Allied ministers in Sofia presented the proposed alliance on 29 May.  
In return for its full and complete participation in hostilities, Bulgaria would receive 
Thrace to the Enos-Midia line and the uncontested zone in Macedonia, up to and 
including Monastir.  Bulgaria could occupy Thrace at its earliest convenience and the 
gains in Macedonia were contingent upon Serbia receiving land in Bosnia and on the 
Adriatic coast.  The Allies also promised full support in pressuring Greece to cede 
Kavalla, and Romania to relinquish the southern Dobrudja.  As in the case of Macedonia, 
theses gains hinged on Athens and Bucharest acquiring territory elsewhere.  Finally, the 
Allies offered generous financial assistance to help mobilize the Bulgarian army.64  The 
military situation was favorable, and the Entente hoped it had finally reached a terminus 
in its negotiations with Sofia.  Radoslavov delayed his response, however, asking for 
further clarification before agreeing to anything.  He had committed to nothing, yet 
Bulgaria was tantalizingly close to its national goals.  The time had now come for 
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Bulgaria to pledge itself to one side or the other, for neutrality or war.  If Bulgaria made 
the right choice, it would be the crowning achievement of decades of struggle. 
On 15 June, Radoslavov finally responded to the offer extended by the Allies.  
Although the prime minister expressed gratitude for the Entente’s generous and fair offer, 
he was not ready to accept it.  He asked for further clarification of Bulgaria’s exact gains, 
how the Allied Powers would aid in negotiations with Romania and how much land 
Greece and Serbia were to receive.65  Although the four powers were not completely 
surprised by this request, they were certainly disappointed, since they were again forced 
to devise a new draft to satisfy Radoslavov.  Nevertheless, Britain was not ready to give 
up, and was prepared to strengthen its offer.  On 25 June, Churchill, recently demoted to 
chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, wrote to Lloyd George, now the minister of 
munitions, “I am all for playing the game out to get Bulgaria.  She is the real prize, & it is 
only if and when we know she will not come that we should consider Greek and Servian 
interests.”66   This sentiment was shared by most of the cabinet.   
As London had grown desperate to secure Sofia, Whitehall showed a greater 
willingness to force Serbia to make concessions in favor of Bulgarian support.  Bax-
Ironside, long criticized for his overly pro-Serbian attitude and ineffectiveness in 
strengthening Bulgaria’s ties to Britain, adamantly protested this change in policy, 
resulting in his replacement as ambassador by Hugh O’Beirne on 17 June.  O’Beirne, 
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who had been Councilor of the Embassy at St. Petersburg since 1906, was Bax-Ironside’s 
opposite in many ways and was regarded as much better suited to helping close a deal 
with Sofia.67  With Britain strongly in favor of soldiering forth, the other Entente powers 
prepared to follow suit and find some way of securing Bulgaria. 
Among the options considered for strengthening the Allied offer, the one that 
gained the most support was one in which each of the Entente powers would pressure 
Greece to cede more land to Bulgaria, since it had been dragging its feet in support of the 
Allies.  The Entente strongly considered granting Sofia specific portions of Macedonia 
for immediate occupation, but Grey objected.  He had no desire to alienate Serbia by 
pressing it to do more than was necessary and was optimistic that Bulgarian support 
would not be necessary in the Gallipoli Campaign.68  France and Italy felt it would be 
wiser to ask Sofia to name what it had in mind rather than raise the ante too high, a 
proposal Britain agreed with in principle, although Whitehall stipulated Bulgaria must 
stay within the general limits set out by other Entente offers.69   
Meanwhile, a steady stream of British individuals began pouring into Bulgaria, 
hopeful they could pressure Sofia to finalize an agreement with the Entente.  O’Beirne 
arrived in Sofia on 7 July, and on 18 July the Foreign Office dispatched Sir Valentine 
Chirol, a diplomat who was an expert on the Balkans, to meet with Ferdinand and other 
Bulgarian politicians.  Churchill even tried to attach himself to a special mission with 
Lord Hankey, who arrived in Bulgaria at the end of the month.  Although he ultimately 
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did not make the trip, Churchill’s attempt shows the level of seriousness with which 
Bulgaria’s entry into the war was being treated.70 
By the beginning of August, the pressure to respond to Radoslavov’s request had 
increased considerably.  The tide was turning against the Allies in the Balkans and the 
Bulgarian army began to show signs of being capable of mobilization.71  Furthermore, 
Sofia and Constantinople had begun to engage in diplomatic talks that could result in 
military cooperation as well as changes to their shared border.  On 3 August, the Entente 
presented its revised offer.  The cities of Drama and Seres were now guaranteed as part of 
the offer regarding Kavalla.  Furthermore, the land which Serbia and Greece would gain 
at the end of the war were now directly tied to the territory they would surrender to 
Bulgaria; a virtual pledge that every attempt would be made to give Bulgaria what it was 
promised.72  To strengthen this offer, Grey authorized O’Beirne to “explain to 
Radoslavoff that a positive reply would bring the Powers to press Servian government to 
accept immediate occupation of eastern Macedonia.”73  It was clear now that the Allies 
were prepared to do everything in their power to secure Bulgaria. 
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With an offer now extended for the immediate seizure of eastern Macedonia, the 
Allies turned their attention to Niš to secure Serbia’s concurrence.  Both Pašić and the 
Serbian military, however, vehemently opposed this proposal.  In order to assuage the 
Serbians, on 16 August, the Allied Powers made a declaration in Niš promising Serbia 
considerable rewards at the end of the war if it accepted their request.  Land in Croatia, 
Albania and the Banat were mentioned, despite potential conflicts with Italy, Greece and 
Romania.74  The Allies could no longer worry about future problems, as they desperately 
needed Serbia’s consent to secure Bulgaria; these issues could be resolved later. 
On 1 September, Pašić responded to the Allies’ request.  While willing to cede 
most of the uncontested zone, the Serbian prime minister refused to allow strategic areas, 
such as Prilep and Monastir, to pass into Bulgarian hands.  In return for these territorial 
concessions, the Allied Powers would have to grant Serbia further territorial gains from 
Austria, including Croatia and Slovenia, and Sofia would have to attack Turkey 
immediately.  Furthermore, Pašić demanded that his country be given equal status with 
the Entente powers, including full participation at the peace conference, additional 
military and financial aid, and a guarantee Bulgaria would not be further compensated 
until Serbia had been first.75  The Allies accepted Pašić’s request to be a full ally, but 
rejected his demands for additional land, the primacy of Serbian claims, and an 
immediate Bulgarian attack on Turkey.76   
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On 14 September, with Serbia’s tacit approval, the Allied ministers presented 
their revisions to Radoslavov.  In return for a Bulgarian assault on Turkey, Sofia would 
receive the uncontested zones of Macedonia according to its 1912 treaty with Serbia.77  
Although the Bulgarian prime minister reacted favorably, the Allies were uncertain 
whether Bulgaria would accept their modifications.   
To a large extent, the Entente’s doubts stemmed from the resurgence the Central 
Powers enjoyed during the summer, which allowed them to renew talks with Bulgaria.  
Like the Entente, the Central Powers had encountered difficulties with one of its allies, 
Turkey, but by the middle of September, they had greater success in bringing it under 
control than the Allies had with Serbia.  Both alliance groups had to force their partners 
to make territorial concessions, but Constantinople was more willing to do so than the 
allies of the Entente.78  The Allied powers had no knowledge of where Bulgaria and the 
Central Powers stood, but at the time of their latest offer on 14 September, they were still 
not confident they had done enough to secure Sofia. 
During May 1915, Vienna and Berlin panicked over the news of the Allies’s 
proposal to Bulgaria.  The firmness of the offer coupled with the pressure the Entente’s 
campaigns in the Straits were placing on Turkey convinced Jagow an agreement would 
be reached shortly.  Consequently, he felt the only thing that could be done was to offer 
the contested and uncontested zones of Macedonia in exchange for Bulgarian neutrality, 
exactly what Radoslavov hoped for when he disclosed the Allies’ offer.79  Burián’s 
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sentiments were in line with Jagow’s, and so both foreign ministers ordered their 
representatives in Sofia to use all their power, influence and diplomatic skill “to keep 
Radoslavov from being pushed from his former policy.”80 
Michahelles and Tarnowski, however, did not share their superiors’ concerns.  
While these new developments were worrisome, both ambassadors were confident 
Bulgaria would not go to war based on the terms offered by the Entente.  Burián and 
Jagow remained unconvinced, and on 6 June, they asked their ministers to present a 
revised offer to Radoslavov.81  In retrospect, the two ambassadors were correct, as the 
prime minister’s response to the Allies on 16 June demonstrated little progress towards a 
military convention had been made.  Sofia, nevertheless, continued to attempt to wrest 
the best deal from both sides. 
Although it appeared at the beginning of June that the Central Powers were 
making little headway in securing Bulgaria, the “crisis” initiated by the Allied offer of 29 
May was the worst trouble they would endure.  On 23 July, Ferdinand sent a 
representative to German military headquarters to draw up a military convention, largely 
because Germany and Austria had finally been able to outbid the Allied Powers.82  The 
tsar found the Allies’ promises vague, conditional, and uncertain, while the Central 
Powers extended a clear and unambiguous offer that appeared to guarantee the full 
integration of Macedonia into Bulgaria.83  
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As the tides of war began to shift in favor of Germany and Austria, Bulgaria also 
began to draw closer to the Central Powers.  On 19 June, the Germans won a key victory 
at Lemberg, effectively pushing the Russians out of Galicia and significantly reducing the 
potential threat of Russian military action in Bulgaria.  Coupled with the failures of the 
Allies at the Straits, both Ferdinand and Radoslavov again favored the Central Powers.  
Tarnowski also began implying at the end of June that Vienna was considering a Serbian 
campaign that would not require Bulgarian aid.  As a joint attack on Serbia had been an 
earlier precondition to a military alliance, this change in military policy indicated Berlin 
and Vienna were serious about achieving victory in the Balkans.84 
Finally pushing Radoslavov to negotiate with the Central Powers were the serious 
discussions with Turkey that he had been engaged in since May.  Since Romania was not 
willing to transport the war materials Constantinople desperately needed, Vienna advised 
its Turkish ally to negotiate a pact with Sofia that would secure safe passage for the 
necessary aid.  Not only was Bulgaria willing to provide this support, but Nikolai 
Kolushev, the Bulgarian ambassador at Constantinople, also reported that his country was 
willing to enter into a defensive-offensive alliance with Turkey.  Knowing the Allies 
were offering Enos-Midia in return for Bulgarian military action, Radoslavov proposed to 
the Porte that it provide the same territory in return for neutrality, thus aligning Sofia’s 
potential gains from the Central Powers with those from the Entente.85   
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On 7 June, however, Kolushev reported that Turkey would cede territory only up 
to the Maritsa River in exchange for a military alliance.86  This did not trouble 
Radoslavov, as he believed Turkey was merely engaging in diplomatic posturing in order 
to secure a better deal.  As the prime minister explained to the Kölnische Zeitung: 
We will gain something from the Turks, we will ask for something more, and the 
Turks will find this completely natural.  In all seriousness, we think as little about 
Enos-Midia as they do.  The Turks will make an offer, we will allow something 
less, and without the interference of the Europeans, we will reach an agreement.87 
 
If Sofia were to join with the Central Powers, Radoslavov explained further, Turkey and 
Bulgaria had to reach an agreement:  “we, the government, will have to become so 
powerful through a swift agreement with Turkey that we could attempt a monstrous thing 
to the people, an alliance against Russia.”88  Acquiring Enos-Midia would not be enough 
to justify an attack on Russia, but it would be for benevolent neutrality, which 
Radoslavov formally offered at this time.  If the Central Powers wanted more from 
Bulgaria, Turkey would need to concede additional land.   
Radoslavov finally overplayed his hand.  He stayed firm to his request for Enos-
Midia in exchange for benevolent neutrality, but since the Turks were now repelling the 
Allied forces at Gallipoli, Constantinople was convinced it no longer needed Bulgarian 
aid.  Furthermore, Turkey also informed Sofia that it would only be willing to cede land 
up to the Maritsa in exchange for Bulgaria’s participation in the war.89  In order to 
maximize Sofia’s gains, Radoslavov had to bring Bulgaria into the conflict.  
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Since Turkey was not willing to make any concessions in Thrace until Bulgaria 
entered into an agreement with the Central Powers, Radoslavov was forced to make a 
decision.  On 3 August, Sofia dispatched Colonel Peter Ganchev, a former military 
attaché in Berlin, to the German military headquarters in Pless to negotiate a military 
convention.  He had full authority to sign an agreement with the Central Powers and 
immediately laid down exactly what Bulgaria required for an alliance.  In addition to 
whatever land Turkey would concede, Ganchev demanded monetary and military aid, 
Seres and Kavalla from Greece (if Athens entered the war), all of Macedonia and 
territory in Serbia up to the Morava River.90   
As these discussions took place with Germany and Austria, Sofia also sped up 
talks with Turkey.  Realizing the Porte’s reluctance to cede Enos-Midia, on 5 August 
Kolushev proposed a compromise: Bulgaria would gain both banks of the Maritsa, as 
well as Lozengrad and Karaagach, the main railheads for Adrianople on the Maritsa’s 
west bank.  Turkey was amenable to this suggestion, and both sides agreed to a military 
alliance on 6 September that had only a few modifications.  Constantinople would cede 
both banks of the Maritsa as well as the land on which the railroad to Dedeagach was 
located.  In return, the Porte would retain Enos, Adrianople and Kirk-Kilisse.  The final 
borders were unsettled, but both parties agreed a joint Austro-German-Swiss commission 
would determine them at the end of the war.91 
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Meanwhile, Ganchev and the Central Powers continued their negotiations.  As 
part of any agreement, Bulgaria required a 15-year defensive alliance and substantial 
military and financial aid.  Territorially, Bulgaria sought immediate occupation of the 
land surrendered by Turkey, all of Macedonia according to the 1912 treaty with Serbia, as 
well as territory in Serbia up to the Morava, Kavalla from Greece, and the Dobrudja from 
Romania should either become a belligerent.92  In essence, Radoslavov, in Jagow’s 
estimation, “believed he could demand all [Bulgaria] desired from us.”93 
Both Jagow and Burián found Sofia’s demands excessive.  The Ballhausplatz 
objected more than the Wilhelmstrasse, but Jagow convinced Burián they needed to press 
forward.94  By 26 August, the German foreign minister had reduced the proposed treaty 
to five articles.  The alliance would last five years and guaranteed German assistance if 
Sofia were attacked by its neighbors.  Military cooperation was now an integral part of 
the treaty.  Bulgaria received nothing for its neutrality, but hefty reward for its entry into 
the war: both the contested and uncontested zones of Macedonia, northeastern Serbia, and 
the land ceded to Greece and Romania in the Treaty of Bucharest, if either declared war 
on Bulgaria.95  Jagow was eager to finalize the agreement and so permitted Michahelles 
to present the revised draft to Radoslavov without Burián’s approval.96  This resulted in a 
wave of protest in Vienna, which found the terms of the treaty too generous.  Jagow 
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found these objections baseless, but agreed to leave any problematic points open for 
revision, promising to support Vienna should modifications be necessary.97   
On 6 September, on the heels of its alliance with Turkey, Sofia signed a military 
agreement with the Central Powers that would take effect the following day.  Bulgaria 
was to attack Serbia within thirty-five days, while Vienna and Berlin would do so within 
thirty.  As Theodor Wolff, the editor of the Berliner Tageblatt recorded in his diary, the 
Bulgarian government “looked forward to the dismemberment of Serbia… and receiving 
Macedonia and northeast Serbia and Kavalla and the Greek coast up to Orphani.”98   
As the treaty’s terms were secret, the Allies had no knowledge a deal had been 
reached.  The Entente tried to push for Serbian concessions, but Pašić again refused.  The 
time for negotiation had passed, he reasoned, and Serbia now had to be prepared for 
another assault.99  The Allied Powers made a final attempt to secure Bulgaria on 14 
September by offering the uncontested zone of Macedonia at war’s end, but Radoslavov 
did not offer a quick response.  Instead, ominous signs, such as mail censorship and open 
discussions in the press of Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia, began to appear. 
On 4 October, Radoslavov formally rejected the Allies’ final offer, claiming Sofia 
needed more territory than what the Entente could give.100  Although things looked bleak, 
                                                 
97 Jagow to Burián, 28 August 1915, AA-PA, R 1937, Fiche J, Series 14692, IA 
Deutschland 128 Nr. 8 secr., band 16. 
98 Theodor Wolff, 9 September 1915, diary entry 212, Theodor Wolff Tagebücher 1914-
1919: Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Entstehung der Weimarer Republik in Tagebüchern, 
Leitartikeln und Briefen des Chefredakturs am „Berliner Tageblatt“ und Mitbegründers 
der „Deutschen Demokratischen Partei,“ edited by Bernd Sösemann, volume 1 (Boppard 
am Rhein: Harold Boldt Verlag, 1985), p. 283. 
99 Grey, Twenty-Five Years, volume 2, p. 232. 
100 O’Beirne to Grey, 4 October 1915, BDFA, part II, series H, volume 2, p. 128. 
   
90 
some in the British press, such as J. D. Bourchier, the Balkan correspondent for The 
Times, and H. M. Wallis, The Times reporter in Sofia, tried to urge the Allied Powers to 
persist, as many in Bulgaria “breathe friendship to England and assure me that Bulgaria 
will never strike hand with Turk and Teuton to the detriment of the land of Gladstone… 
valiantly resisting the machinations of a Royal dictator running amok whilst his 
Parliament is not in session.”101  The Entente made one final attempt to avoid war when 
they presented an ultimatum to Radoslavov demanding all German officers attached to 
the Bulgarian army be sent back to Berlin.102  Sofia made no answer, and the Bulgarian 
ambassador to Germany, Dimitir Rizov, declared to the German press, “we will not 
betray our friends.  Germany does not need to worry that we will abandon it, like 
Italy.”103  On 5 October, the Allied representatives asked for their passports and left 
Sofia, while the Serbian envoy followed the next day.  On 11 October, Bulgaria attacked 
Serbia.  By December, Serbia was crushed and the Central Powers claimed a major 
victory in the Balkans.  The deadlock that had lasted more than a year had been broken as 
Bulgaria moved to fulfill its national goals.
                                                 
101 The Times (London), 3 October 1915. 
102 Grey to O’Beirne, 4 October 1915, BDFA, part II, series H, volume 2, p. 132. 
103 Berliner Tageblatt, 5 October 1915. 
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Epilogue 
The Success of the Central Powers and the Failure of the Allies 
 
 
 In October 1915, Bulgaria became the first of the neutral Balkan states to enter 
the war, doing so on the side of the Central Powers.  The effect was immediate and 
pronounced.  Not only was Bulgaria’s entry a diplomatic setback for the Entente and a 
boon for Austria and Germany, but it enabled the Central Powers to control an unbroken 
swathe of territory from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf.1  By the end of 1915, Serbia 
was defeated, Russian was driven back, and the Salonika Front was trapped.  Much of the 
land promised to Sofia in its alliance with the Central Powers was under Bulgarian sway.  
The national goal of a large Bulgarian state more or less corresponding to the two 
medieval empires at their height had been achieved, if only for a few years.  By the 
summer of 1918, the Central Powers, so close to victory three years earlier, suffered a 
series of reversals that culminated in their defeat.  With the signing Treaty of Neuilly on 
27 November 1919, Bulgaria endured another humiliating defeat, one even worse than 
the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913.  This seems to suggest that Prime Minister Radoslavov 
and Tsar Ferdinand had erred in joining the Central Powers, but given the diplomatic 
situation at the time, they acted in what they perceived to be their country’s best interests. 
 Since 1878, when Bulgaria was granted autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, 
Sofia had followed a distinct national policy of uniting all Bulgarians, claiming the land 
that belonged to it historically and ethnographically.  The generous terms of the Treaty of 
San Stefano had brought this about, but the Treaty of Berlin, engineered by Germany’s 
                                                 
1 Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History, p. 341. 
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“honest broker,” Otto von Bismarck, overturned them.  As a result, Bulgaria spent the 
next forty years trying to rectify what it believed to be a major injustice.  It took a step 
forward in 1908 when it gained its independence, and came tantalizingly close to its goals 
after the First Balkan War.  Sofia grew too powerful for its allies, however, and lost much 
of its new territory in 1913 in the Treaty of Bucharest.  In order to restore what had been 
taken away, Bulgaria sought to undermine this agreement.   
As the European powers moved closer to war in 1914, Radoslavov used the 
Bulgarian loan issue to showcase Bulgaria’s strategic importance and achieved a victory 
that was only a prelude to his greatest challenge, Bulgaria’s role in World War I.  In 
August 1914, Radoslavov believed, “it seemed, that because of the situation created by 
the general war, the most propitious and useful thing I could do for the Motherland was 
to rectify the political errors of predecessors and serve the true interest of the Bulgarian 
people with all cleverness and skill.”2  Tsar Ferdinand realized that, “ as both warring 
sides recognized the great injustice which was inflicted upon Bulgaria with the dastardly 
business of Macedonia, and agreed that the greater part of Macedonia needs to belong to 
Bulgaria,” Sofia could take a major step forward in restoring San Stefano Bulgaria.3   
 The diplomatic negotiations that followed demonstrated Radoslavov’s skills at 
their highest level.  Step by step, he played both alliance groups off each other, never 
promising anything more than he had to, while garnering guarantees of more and more 
territory.  The protraction of the war aided him greatly, as both sides grew increasingly 
                                                 
2 Vasil Radoslavov, Bulgaria und die Weltkriese (Berlin: Ulstein und Verlag, 1923), p. 
157. 
3 Ferdinand 54-8 1915, “Manifest na Bulgarskite narod,” 1 October 1915 OS, as quoted 
in Hall, Bulgaria’s Road, p. 307. 
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desperate for Bulgaria’s assistance.  As 1915 rolled on, Radoslavov flitted between the 
Allied and Central Powers as each looked to be close to victory; all the while, he pushed 
for more land until both sides promised what he wanted.  While the Bulgarian prime 
minister hoped this would be the price for neutrality, he had to make a military 
commitment in order to secure Sofia’s desiderata.  The Central Powers made the better 
offer, and by September 1915, appeared to be on the verge of victory.  Once again, 
Bulgaria went to war for the sake of its national ambitions.  Radoslavov played his hand 
nearly perfectly in securing this diplomatic victory, but the efforts, successes and failures 
of the Central and Allied Powers played a major role in shaping Bulgaria’s decision. 
 The lack of unity and clear course of action in persuading Bulgaria minimized the 
Allies’ effectiveness in their negotiations.  Each time it appeared it was ready to take the 
next step, one member would object, hindering the Entente’s progress.  This was 
particularly true of Britain, whose policy was beset by muddled approaches, indecision, 
and repeated setbacks.  Grey and Asquith were too sensitive to Serbian sensibilities, 
refusing to ask too much of Niš until it was nearly too late.  Pašić used these sentiments 
to his advantage, steadfastly refusing to make the concessions necessary to draw Bulgaria 
into the war.  Hesitancy when opportunities did present themselves further inhibited the 
Entente’s efforts.  Over the course of 1914-1915, Greece, Serbia and Romania either 
reluctantly agreed to cede territory that had been off-limits, expressed a willingness to 
join the Allies, or both, but the Entente failed to take advantage.   
The final hindrance to the Allies, however, was their lack of military success.  
While having some initial good fortune with the Dardanelles Campaign and in repelling 
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the Austrian attack on Serbia, by the summer of 1915, the Entente had suffered a series of 
reversals that made the prospect of victory seem unlikely.  Even the entry of Italy into the 
war in May 1915 failed to change things, as Rome failed to make headway in its attack 
on Austria.  Coupled with the inability to produce an agreeable, compelling offer, the 
failure to style themselves as the eventual victor was the final nail in Allies’ coffin.   J. D. 
Bourchier wrote that Ferdinand and Radoslavov “ believed Germany was going to win 
and that if they were not with her they would lose Macedonia.  The miserable blunders of 
[British] diplomacy no doubt confirmed this impression.”4  Near the end of 1915, Lloyd 
George addressed Parliament and his words perhaps best capture the Entente’s failure: 
Ah! Fatal words of this war!  Too late in moving here!  Too late in arriving there!  
Too late in coming to this decision!  Too late in starting with enterprises!  Too 
late in preparing!  In this war the footsteps of Allied forces have been dogged by 
the mocking spectre of “Too Late;” and unless we quicken our movements 
damnation will fall on the cause for which so much gallant blood has flowed.5 
 
 Vienna and Berlin also endured problems in securing Sofia.  Military setbacks in 
1914 did little to inspire confidence in their strength.  Turkey’s entrance, however, was a 
major boon, as it demonstrated the Central Powers’ potential for success in the east.  By 
May 1915, the Central Powers seemed to be on the verge of defeat, but as the summer 
wore on, Germany, Austria and Turkey won a series of important victories, dramatically 
reversing their fortunes and providing the final push to win over Bulgaria.   
 Nevertheless, a host of other factors also brought Sofia and the Mittelmächte 
together.  Unlike the Allies, Berlin and Vienna remained focused in their bid to secure 
                                                 
4 J. D. Bourchier, letter to The Times (London), 15 November 1915. 
5 Lloyd George, speech in House of Commons, 20 December 1915, as quoted in Martin 
S. Gilbert, Lloyd George (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 159. 
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Bulgaria and continued to act in concert throughout this process.  Berchtold, Burián, and 
Jagow constantly exchanged ideas that would be to the mutual benefit of their countries.  
Even when Austria balked at the promise of so much land in the final negotiations, it 
ultimately fell in line with its ally.  Most importantly, the Central Powers displayed the 
force majeure necessary to compel its Balkan ally to make territorial concessions.  While 
Turkey did not promise exactly what Radoslavov desired, he knew Germany and Austria 
would guarantee that land, making it clear that the Central Powers were serious about 
having Bulgaria as an ally. 
 Indeed, the territory the Central Powers offered was the tipping point in securing 
Sofia.  While both the Allies and the Central Powers had made strong offers, the latter 
was able to grant more territory faster.  As much as it desired Thrace, Kavalla and the 
southern Dobrudja, Bulgaria’s true desire was Macedonia.  By the summer of 1915, 
Berlin was so desperate for Bulgarian aid that it was willing to offer all of Macedonia for 
immediate occupation, something Serbia had refused without compensation elsewhere.   
In September 1915 Sofia allied itself with Germany and Austria-Hungary.  
Radoslavov had bargained long and hard, and Bulgaria contributed its fair share in 
exchange for the concessions it was promised.  Although Sofia sold its services to the 
side that granted the most land, there was little else it could do, as Germany and its allies 
also offered the promise of victory.  Radoslavov and Ferdinand believed the Central 
Powers would be able to deliver on their assurances and restore Bulgaria’s national 
fortunes.  Sofia took a calculated gamble, but, in the end, it failed to pay off, and San 
Stefano Bulgaria once again became nothing more than a dream for future generations.
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Appendix I 
The Balkans Following the Second Balkan War, 1913 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Silberstein, Troubled Alliance, endpapers. 
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Appendix II 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Silberstein, Troubled Alliance, p. 125. 
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Appendix III 
Final Offer of Territory to Bulgaria by the Entente, 1915 
 
 
 
Source: Napier, Experiences of a Military Attaché, Map Insert. 
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Appendix IV 
 
 
 
Source: Silberstein, Troubled Alliance, p. 175. 
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Appendix V 
Alternative Names of Places Mentioned 
 
Name As It Appears Herein   Variation(s) 
 
Struma River       Strymónas (Greek) 
 
Vardar River       Axios (Greek) 
 
Adrianople       Edirne (Turkish), Odrin (Bulgarian) 
 
Enos       Enez (Turkish) 
 
Midia       Kiyiköy/Midye (Turkish) 
 
Kirk-Kilisse      Kirkkilisse/Kirklareli (Turkish)  
Lozengrad (Bulgarian) 
 
Silistria       Silistra 
 
Salonika       Thessaloniki (Greek) 
 
Kurdjali       Kardzhali  (Bulgarian alternative)  
 
Dedeagach      Alexandroupoli (Greek) 
 
Kavalla       Kavala (Greek)  
 
Maritsa River      Evros (Greek) 
 
Porto Lagos      Lagos/Porto Lago (Greek) 
 
Monastir      Bitola, Manastir (Turkish) 
 
Ochrida      Ohrid 
 
Dibra       Debar (Macedonian, Serbian, Bulgarian) 
 
Lake Ohrid       Lake Ochrid(a) 
 
Seres        Sérres (Greek) 
 
Lemberg      Lviv (Ukrainian), Lwów (Polish) 
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Morava River      March (German), Morva (Hungarian) 
 
Karaagach       Karagatch, Karaağaç (Turkish) 
 
 
n.b. Where appropriate, the language in which the name variation occurs is given in 
parentheses.  If no designation is indicated, the name that appears is a variation of the 
named used in this thesis and/or its modern equivalent. 
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Appendix VI 
The Treaty of Alliance with Bulgaria 
 
Article 1.  The High Contracting Parties promise mutual peace and friendship and to 
enter no alliance or agreement directed against the other. 
 They agree to follow a policy of friendship and to offer aid in their spheres of 
interest. 
 
Article 2.  Germany [Austria-Hungary] guarantees the defense of Bulgarian political 
independence and territorial integrity against all attack which could result without 
provocation on the side of the Bulgarian government. 
 Should Germany [Austria-Hungary] be attacked by a neighboring state of 
Bulgaria, Bulgaria is obligated to take action against this state as soon as this is 
demanded of it. 
 
Article 3.  This alliance remains in force until 31 December 1920; if it has not been 
modified six months before it expires it will remain in being for an additional year and 
will continue to be renewed yearly so long as notice is not given. 
 
Article 4.  This alliance shall remain secret until a new understanding is reached. 
 
Article 5.  This treaty will be ratified and the ratifications exchanged in Sofia eight days, 
at the latest, after signature. 
 
Secret Annex 
 
1. Germany [Austria-Hungary] guarantees Bulgaria the acquisition and 
annexation of the following territories: 
 
 a. Present-day Serbian-Macedonia, including the so-called contested and 
uncontested zones, as delineated by the Serb-Bulgarian Alliance of 29 February (13 
March) 1912 and by the map accompanying this treaty.  
 
 b. Serbian territory east of the following line: the Morava river from where it joins 
the Danube to a point where the Bulgarian Morava and Serbian Morava join, following 
the watershed of both these rivers, running through the ridge of Tschernagora, the 
Katchanik Pass, the ridge of Schar-Planina, until reaching the frontier of San Stefano 
Bulgaria.  The borderline is shown on the accompanying map and constitutes an 
inseparable part of the agreement. 
 
 2. In the case where Romania, during the present conflict, attacks Bulgaria, its 
allies, or Turkey, without any provocation on the part of Bulgaria, Germany [Austria-
Hungary] agrees that Bulgaria will annex the area ceded to Romania by the Treaty of 
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Bucharest, and to a rectification of the Bulgarian-Romanian border as delimited by the 
Treaty of Berlin. 
 
 3. In the case where Greece, in the course of the present war, attacks Bulgaria, its 
allies, or Turkey, without any provocation on the part of Bulgaria, Germany [Austria-
Hungary] agrees to Bulgarian annexation of the area ceded to Greece by the Treaty of 
Bucharest. 
 
 4. Both of the concluding parties reserve the right of further agreements with 
respect to conclusion of peace. 
 
 5. Germany and Austria-Hungary mutually bind themselves to guarantee the 
Bulgarian government a war loan of 200 million francs, which shall be paid in four 
installments: 
  
a. the first installment of 50 million francs on the day of mobilization. 
b. The second 50 million a month later. 
c. The third 50 million two months later 
d. The fourth 50 million three months after the day of mobilization. 
 
The detail of this loan shall be set by an agreement between the finance 
authorities. 
 If the war lasts longer than four months, Germany and Austria guarantee Bulgaria 
a new supplementary loan, if such proves necessary, and after previous agreement. 
 
 6. This agreement shall come into force together with the military convention.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Michahelles to Bethmann-Hollweg, 13 September 1915, enclosure, AA-PA, R 1939, 
Fiche J, Series 14696, IA Deutschland, Nr. 8 secr., band 18.  The translation above is 
from Silberstein, Troubled Alliance, pp. 173-174. 
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